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ABSTRACT
Courts have interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) not to affirmatively require
accommodations for pregnant workers. This has generated protest and led
all three branches of the federal government to address the issue of
pregnancy rights. The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act is pending in
Congress and has drawn strong vocal support from President Barack
Obama. The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided Young v. UPS, which
found the PDA does not affirmatively require pregnancy accommodations.
Finally, many commentators have argued in support of considering
pregnancy a disability under the ADA.
This Article agrees substantively with the end of accommodating
pregnancy, but disagrees with the various proposals commentators have
advanced. In contrast to those who favor a pregnancy-specific right to
accommodations, this Article argues that such proposals create risks to
women’s long-term equality in the workplace. In particular, characterizing
pregnancy as a “disability” or pregnant women as a class in special need
of accommodation poses a danger of expressive harms. Currently proposed
measures may revitalize exclusionary and paternalistic attitudes toward
pregnant employees, signal incapacity to work, or actually increase sex
discrimination. We should thus consider the potential expressive impact of
pregnancy accommodation schemes in light of current social norms in
which pregnant women are generally seen as capable of productive work.
This Article concludes by suggesting alternative approaches to securing
pregnancy accommodations that would avoid expressive harms and employ
a gender- symmetrical approach.
This Article’s critique and the question of how best to accommodate
pregnancy resonate across several areas of the law. For those who study
civil rights, Accommodating Pregnancy illustrates the expressive perils of
rights claiming. For historians and scholars interested in gender issues,
this Article provides a chance to reconsider the consequences of genderasymmetrical laws. For family law scholars, Accommodating Pregnancy
highlights the current capacity of the law to reshape work–family balance.
To assume that implementing gender-asymmetrical rights is the best way to
help women in the workplace overlooks the potential of the law to
ameliorate broader social issues. These include the way in which
employment is typically structured to accommodate the most privileged
employees and how everyone would benefit from more accommodating
workplaces.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a near consensus has arisen that pregnant women need
the affirmative right to workplace accommodations. Legal commentators
have advanced three approaches to potentially secure such a right. One
argument is that pregnancy should fall within the scope of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 and warrant accommodation as a disability.2
A second approach is that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)3
should entitle pregnant workers to any accommodations offered to other
employees who are similar in their ability to work.4 A third proposal is that
pregnant workers need an independent statute entitling them to
accommodation.5
The PDA approach has been for now constrained. In 2015, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,6 which
clarified, among other things, that the PDA is not a guarantor of
accommodations for pregnant employees.7 However, the other two

1. American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–03, 12111–17, 12131–34, 12141–50, 12161–65, 12181–89, 12201–13 (2012)).
2. See, e.g., Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical
Analysis of the ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1 (2012) (arguing pregnant
workers ought to be able to make reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA); Deborah A.
Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing
employers are required to accommodate pregnancy under the ADA); Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as
“Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443 (2012) (arguing
the ADA should be interpreted to require accommodation for pregnancy-related limitations); Joan C.
Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2013) (arguing that more conditions associated with pregnancy can
constitute ADA-qualifying impairments than has typically been understood); Anastasia Latsos, Note,
ADA Reform and Stork Parking: A Glimmer of Hope for the Pregnant, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 193
(2011) (advocating for coverage under the ADA); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and
Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO.
L.J. 193 (1993) (arguing pregnancy should be covered under the ADA).
3. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
4. E.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 68 (2013) (arguing the PDA should be
reinvigorated to more often provide pregnant workers with accommodations); Deborah A. Widiss,
Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with
Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 961–62 (2013) (arguing pregnant women ought to be
entitled to accommodations under the PDA if an employer makes accommodations for other employees
with comparable workplace limitations). Part I will explain why courts do not interpret the PDA to
afford pregnant employees that right.
5. See, for example, the federal bipartisan bill currently pending in Congress, Pregnant Workers
Fairness Act, S. 1512, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2654, 114th Cong. (2015).
6. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
7. Certainly, Young has made it more likely that employers will voluntarily extend pregnancy
accommodations simply as a matter of being safe rather than sorry. In other words, because the holding
is complicated and not perfectly clear, overcompliance may be rational. Still, the holding of Young is a
far cry from what was sought by the petitioner and had been sought for years by advocates. See also
infra Part I.A for more explanation of Young.
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approaches remain viable for potentially guaranteeing pregnancy
accommodations. The ADA approach has proven to be the most popular
among commentators,8 especially in the wake of the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 (ADAAA),9 which relaxed the legal standard for proving
disability. The independent law approach is reflected in legislation
emerging across the country that aims at expanding the accommodation
rights of pregnant workers. In June 2015, Congress reintroduced the
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, a federal bill originally introduced in 2012
that would require employers to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.10 The bill is currently
pending in Congress and has drawn strong support from President Barack
Obama.11 Additionally, sixteen states have recently passed, or have
pending, laws designed to ensure reasonable accommodations for pregnant
employees.12
But are these proposed reforms unequivocally beneficial for pregnant
employees, and women more generally? This Article agrees substantively
with the goal of pregnancy accommodations, but takes issue with the
proposals13 outlined above, all of which seek a pregnancy-specific right to
8. See, e.g., Alemzadeh, supra note 2 (arguing pregnant workers ought to be able to make
reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA); Cox, supra note 2 (arguing the ADA should be
interpreted to require accommodation for pregnancy-related limitations); Latsos, supra note 2
(advocating for coverage under the ADA).
9. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
10. S. 1512; H.R. 2654.
11. Emily Martin, President Obama Stands Up for Pregnant Workers, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.
(June 24, 2014), http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/president-obama-stands-pregnant-workers (quoting
President Obama as saying we must “treat[] pregnant workers fairly, because too many are forced to
choose between their health and their job. Right now, if you’re pregnant you could potentially get fired
for taking too many bathroom breaks—clearly from a boss who has never been pregnant—or forced
[onto] unpaid leave. That makes no sense.”).
12. These states have a varied assortment of laws and proposals. Four states grant a general right
to reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, usually upon the advice of a physician. CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 12945 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (West 2013 & Supp. 2014);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12s (West 2013 & Supp. 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11B-2 (2013 & Supp.
2015). Two states provide a right to reasonable accommodation by transfer. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7) (2009 & Supp. 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:342 (2010). Three states provide a
pregnancy-related, disability-based right to reasonable accommodation. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2102(I), (J) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-609 (LexisNexis 2014);
HAW. CODE R. § 12-46-107 (LexisNexis 1990). Two states have reasonable accommodation laws that
apply only to certain public employers. ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.520 (2014) (providing a right to
accommodation by transfer for public employees); 15 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 180.004 (West
2008) (providing a right to reasonable accommodation for public employees, upon the advice of a
physician). Finally, five more states have pending legislation, which would grant a general right to
reasonable accommodation, subject to an undue hardship defense—similar to that which exists under
the ADA. S.B. 417, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014); H.B. 2102, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2014); S.B. 1209, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014); S. File 308, 85th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2013); S. 1479, 81st Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
13. This Article frequently uses the term “proposal” to discuss en masse the different approaches
to potentially securing an entitlement to pregnancy accommodations.
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accommodations. This Article critiques these proposals’ implicit messages
about pregnancy, women generally, and their relationship to work. In
particular, laws “make statements” and cause people to internalize certain
values.14 They may also reinforce social norms15 or send a signal about
what the norms of a society ought to be.16 Further, a law’s expression may
include negative or inappropriate characterizations and thus inflict
expressive or stigmatic harms on an individual or group.17 Twenty-five
years ago, Martha Minow wrote about the “dilemma of difference” as it
applies to pregnant workers.18 Giving pregnant employees exceptional
rights, she noted, may “assign negative symbolism” to such an employee,
as well as possibly “revitalize prejudices against women as workers more
generally.”19
This Article blends social science and empirical insights regarding
pregnancy, disability, and accommodations to argue that the proposals
discussed above may inflict expressive harms on and increase
discrimination against all female employees.20 Equating pregnancy with
disability or campaigning for a special right to accommodation may signal
that pregnancy is a deficiency or send the message that pregnant women
are innately less capable of productive work. This is best seen against the
contrast of current social norms regarding pregnancy, disability, and
accommodations—and the relationship of each to work.21 The Western
perception of pregnancy has evolved over time from a condition seen as
requiring isolation to one that allows women to remain active and keep
working.22 The meaning of disability, by contrast, has been more static and
is comprised in part by a binary distinction between disability and

14. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 680 (1998)
(observing that expressive law scholars recognize that the expressive function of law works not through
something physical, but through something interpretive); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle,
Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 666–68
(2004) (discussing the expressive capacity of law); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 (1996) (exploring “the function of law in ‘making statements’
as opposed to controlling behavior directly”).
15. See Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
669, 670 (2003).
16. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 43
(2002); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 2029–44.
17. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504, 1527, 1529, 1542, 1544, 1569 (2000). By expressive
harms, I mean the negative impact on social norms and understandings that flow from the message or
expression of a particular proposal or policy. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 87 (1990).
19. Id.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.B–D.
22. See infra Part II.B.
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employability that reaches back to the Elizabethan poor laws.23 Indeed, the
very semantics of the word “disability” may communicate lack of ability.24
Further, many employers (incorrectly) view accommodations as costly
measures intended to compensate for innate deficiencies.25 How we frame
pregnancy rights naturally implicates fundamental principles relating to sex
discrimination and thus has expressive value for all women—especially if
such expressions signal that pregnant women are less fit to work.26
Commentators have generally ignored the potential drawbacks to
treating pregnancy specially or as a disability. A few scholars have
observed that there could be some negative fallout to pregnancy
accommodation reform but they have tended to minimize such concerns.27
The characterization of pregnancy as a disability or as otherwise in unique
need of accommodation is not a trivial concern.28 As Ruth Bader Ginsburg
once wrote, “discrimination by gender generally cuts with two edges and is
seldom, if ever, a pure favor to women.”29
This Article agrees substantively with the proposals above that
pregnancy ought to be accommodated, but disagrees over the shape of the
remedy.30 There are alternatives to drawing distinctions for accommodation
purposes on the basis of sex or disability. For example, I along with others
have argued that reasonable accommodations should be available liberally
to all workers and without reference to a protected-class identity.31 A
23. See Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 809, 821–22 (1966); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and
the ADA Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 230 (2012) (“Disability is rarely understood as a
positive state or identity with social or cultural benefits to its bearers or those around them.”)
24.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines disability as “[t]he inability to perform some
function; . . . [a]n objectively measurable condition of impairment, physical or mental.” Disability,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Dictionary.com defines disability as “lack of adequate
power, strength, or physical or mental ability; incapacity.” Disability, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/disability (last visited Apr. 1, 2016). See also Michael Ashley
Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV.
1151, 1178 (2004) (book review) (“A primary social convention regarding people with disabilities is
one that equates their biological atypicality with inherent lesser ability.”).
25. See infra Part II.D.
26. See infra Part II.E.
27. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 451 (“Most obviously, the ADA’s inclusion of relatively
minor and short-term physical limitations ameliorates feminist concerns that characterizing pregnancy
as a disability might revive exaggerated stereotypes about the physical limitations that accompany
pregnancy.” (emphasis added)).
28. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1561–62 (observing that expressive restraints are
not “trivial” or a mere matter of etiquette).
29. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Court’s Grapplings with Sex Discrimination, in THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 132, 140 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
30. See Wendy W. Williams, Notes from A First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 109
(distinguishing between agreement over substance of a measure and the “shape the remedy” ought to
take).
31. See generally SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 51–54 (2009); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship
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narrow, protected-class approach to securing workplace accommodations is
neither the most expressively, economically, or structurally beneficial
regime, nor is it systematically defensible.32
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the stage by briefly
examining the law of pregnancy accommodations—in particular, what laws
possibly provide such a right and whether they are sufficient to the task.
This examination gives special attention to the recently decided Young
case. Part I then contextualizes the recent push to secure the affirmative
right to pregnancy accommodations. Finally, Part I reflects upon the PDA’s
passage almost thirty years ago. The history of the PDA’s passage is
instructive in that gender-asymmetrical approaches to helping women in
the workplace may be hazardous for long-term equality.
Part II draws upon the rich sociological literature to characterize the
social meanings of pregnancy, disability, and accommodations—and, in
particular, the way in which those social meanings implicate perceived
capacity to work. These strands of inquiry, woven together, constitute the
background for my argument that pregnancy accommodation proposals, if
successful, may signal that pregnant employees are less fit for work. To the
extent this impacts employers’ perceptions regarding such employees, there
is risk for all women who are seen as likely to become pregnant.33
Part III then briefly considers alternatives. There are gender- and
disability-neutral ways to conceptualize what the need for pregnancy
accommodations entails as well as to accommodate pregnancy. This part
builds upon a cadre of esteemed scholars and advocates, who have favored
addressing disadvantage more broadly, to sketch out two alternative paths
for pregnancy accommodation reform: universal accommodations and
parental accommodations. Pitching the need for accommodation more
broadly addresses the root problem of unaccommodating workplaces, while
mitigating the stigmatic effects that may stem from treating pregnancy
specially or equating pregnancy with disability. This part then addresses
some objections, and a brief conclusion follows.

Between Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081,
1108–12 (2010); Michael Ashley Stein, Anita Silvers, Bradley A. Areheart & Leslie Pickering Francis,
Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (2014) (arguing for an ADA-type reasonable
accommodation mandate to apply to all work-capable members of the general population for whom
accommodation is necessary to enable their ability to work).
32. See Stein et al., supra note 31, at 750–55 (discussing the benefits of a broad, universal-like
right to reasonable accommodations).
33. See infra Part II.E.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2534216

5 AREHEART 1125-1177 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/19/2016 1:46 PM

Accommodating Pregnancy

1133

I. THE LAW OF PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATIONS
There are a myriad of ways in which a routine pregnancy may produce
the need for an accommodation. A pregnant employee may experience
physical limitations in the areas of sitting, standing, bending, lifting, or
climbing, and may require an accommodation in order to keep doing her
job. Other accommodations are not required due to any physical limitations
in the employee’s ability to do the job but are instead needed to avoid
running afoul of a company’s policies or rules. A few well-publicized
examples of the latter involve pregnant employees who lost their jobs
because it was against store policy to carry or keep a water bottle nearby.34
One employer prevented its pregnant employee from modifying her
uniform to accommodate her growing belly; instead, the employee was
forced to take leave once she outgrew her uniform.35 The most commonly
requested accommodations include frequent bathroom breaks,36 limits on
heavy lifting,37 and limitations on overtime work.38
Some employers voluntarily accommodate such needs, but many do
not, and employers are not generally required by law to do so. Even in
those few instances where an employer capitulates to a requested
accommodation, there is a difference between accommodation by legal
right and accommodation by favor. Hence, advocates have sought the force
of law to accompany pregnancy accommodation requests.
A. No Affirmative Right Under Current Federal Law
The popular upsurge in favor of pregnancy accommodations emerges
from the failure of relevant laws to provide such an affirmative right. One
might assume statutes like the ADA, the PDA, or the Family and Medical
34. Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan.
June 9, 2009) (pregnant employee fired for carrying a water bottle as recommended by her doctor);
Jeannette Cox, Disability Law Should Cover Pregnant Workers, CNN (Jan. 10, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/10/opinion/cox-pregnancy-disability/; Diana Reese, Laws Fail to Protect
Pregnant Women Who Need Special Accommodations on the Job, WASH. POST: SHE THE PEOPLE (June
18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2013/06/18/laws-fail-to-protectpregnant-women-who-need-special-accommodations-on-the-job/.
35. Williams et al., supra note 2, at 3.
36. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 13-CV-21374, 2014 WL 2916447, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. June 19, 2014) (pregnant employee whose doctor requested she be allowed “frequent bathroom
breaks” was denied by her employer extra bathroom breaks).
37. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4 RM, 2010 WL 1568606, at *1
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010), aff’d, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011) (pregnant employee who was instructed
by doctor to avoid lifting heavy weights was denied by employer assistance with minor responsibilities
that involved such lifting).
38. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 945–46 (10th Cir.
1992) (pregnant employee fired for refusing to work overtime, which was the advice received from her
doctor).
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Leave Act (FMLA)39 provide an entitlement to pregnancy
accommodations. In fact, they do not, except under limited comparative
instances.
i.

The Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability.”40 The statute defines discrimination to include “not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee,” unless making such accommodations would result
in “undue hardship” to the employer.41 While some of the ADA’s language
might seem to hold promise for pregnancy, the ADA’s regulations exclude
it from coverage.42 Courts have similarly followed suit, on the rationale that
pregnancy is “normal” and “healthy”—i.e., it is not the result of a
physiological disorder and thus is categorically not an impairment or
disability.43 In other words, a “normal” pregnancy does not produce ADAcovered limitations, but conditions that arise due to complications in a
pregnancy may qualify as disabilities.44 For example, pregnancy may cause
discrete physiological conditions such as gestational diabetes or carpal
tunnel syndrome, which may constitute a disability under the ADA,
entitling a pregnant worker to reasonable accommodations. But limitations
intrinsically associated with a typical pregnancy, such as the need for more
rest or more frequent bathroom breaks, would not generally entitle one to
accommodations under the ADA.45 A separate reason many physical
limitations accompanying pregnancy have been excluded is that they have

39. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–19, 2631–36, 2651–54 (2012)).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
41. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
42. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (2015) (“[C]onditions, such as pregnancy, that are not
the result of a physiological disorder are also not impairments. However, a pregnancy-related
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is a disability under the first prong of the
definition.”).
43. E.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 2013) (“With near
unanimity, federal courts have held that pregnancy is not a ‘disability’ under the ADA.” (quoting with
approval Wenzlaff v. NationsBank, 940 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D. Md. 1996))), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338
(2015); Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 974, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002); see also
Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 556 (7th Cir. 2011); Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distrib.
Co., 331 F. Supp. 2d 780, 790 (S.D. Iowa 2004); Gover v. Speedway Super Am., LLC, 254 F. Supp. 2d
695, 705 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Ky.
1996); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
44. See Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 556; Walker, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 790; Gorman, 209 F. Supp. 2d at
974, 976; Gover, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
45. But see Williams et al., supra note 2, at 99 (arguing many pregnancy-related impairments, in
the wake of the ADAAA, are now covered disabilities).
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been considered temporary conditions.46 Even after the Amendments,
temporary physical limitations requiring accommodation still must satisfy
the ADA’s definition for “actual disability,”47 a higher threshold than
merely proving one is “regarded as” having a disability.48 The ultimate
result is that pregnant women are left without a general entitlement to
workplace accommodations under the ADA.
ii. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Courts have similarly interpreted the PDA to not provide pregnant
employees with a right to accommodations. The statute principally secures
the right to nondiscrimination.49 The PDA has two clauses and is found in
the definitions section of Title VII.50 The “first clause” redefines “sex”
under Title VII to include pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.51 The “second clause,” which is separated by a semicolon,
provides that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work.”52 The PDA thus clearly indicates that an employer
cannot use pregnancy as a reason to fire a worker, cut her pay, or deny her
46. E.g., Villarreal, 895 F. Supp. at 152 (finding pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA
because it is too short in duration).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2012) (exempting from “regarded as” claims, conditions that
are both minor and short-term).
48. The ADA’s employment provisions allow a claimant to fall under one of three definitions of
disability: (a) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities
of such individual” (“actual” disability); (b) “a record of such an impairment” (“record of” disability);
or (c) “being regarded as having such an impairment” (“regarded as” disability). § 12102(1).
Commentators have characterized the Amendments as universalizing the ability to bring a disability
nondiscrimination claim, through the “regarded as” prong (since anyone alleging they experienced
discrimination on the basis of disability can make a colorable claim they were “regarded as” having a
disability), but keeping a higher bar in place for accommodation claims, which may now only be
brought under the “actual disability” or “record of disability” prongs. Kevin Barry, Toward
Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 263 (2010) (arguing that keeping the bar relatively high for securing
an accommodation was part of the political compromise necessary to achieve the amendments’
passage).
49. For example, historian Deborah Dinner writes, “[t]he PDA created a baseline requirement of
equal treatment for pregnancy and temporary disabilities but did not create an affirmative entitlement to
pregnancy-related benefits.” Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the
Making of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 459 (2014); see also Joanna L.
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 570 (2010)
(“The PDA . . . is modeled on a basic formal equality framework, which provides no absolute right to
accommodation necessitated by pregnancy.”). Cf. Widiss, supra note 4 (arguing the PDA is properly
interpreted as providing a comparative right to accommodation if an employer accommodates similar
workplace limitations).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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health benefits. To do so under the PDA would be discrimination based on
sex. The accommodation hook under the PDA is that you also cannot use
pregnancy as the reason to deny the “benefit” of accommodations to
employees who are “similar in their ability or inability to work”—i.e., who
are “comparators.”53
The critical question is who is an appropriate comparator for
accommodation purposes.54 Prior to Young v. UPS, courts universally
approved the legality under the PDA of accommodations made pursuant to
pregnancy-blind rules.55 In other words, an employee who was
accommodated pursuant to a pregnancy-neutral rule or law—e.g., under the
ADA or a rule that entitles those injured on the job to an accommodation—
was said not to be an appropriate comparator since the relevant rule kept
the employee who was accommodated from being similarly situated to the
pregnant worker.56 Any right to an accommodation under the PDA has thus
historically been about pregnant employees’ right not to arbitrarily be
treated worse than others due to their pregnancy.57
The Young case considered whether comparators for pregnant
employees should be understood more broadly.58 In particular, the Court
was asked to determine under what circumstances an employer who
provides work accommodations to non-pregnant employees with work
limitations must also provide work accommodations to pregnant employees

53. Id. Disparate treatment, the standard cause of action for all employment discrimination
statutes, typically requires proof that the plaintiff was treated differently than a person of a different
race or sex or disability status, e.g., was (or would have been) treated. Accordingly, many disparate
treatment cases turn on whether the plaintiff can identify “comparators” who are similarly situated to
her except for her race, sex, or disability status, and were treated differently. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN,
RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND
ITS LIMITATIONS 523 (2d ed. 2011). See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by
Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009).
54. Identifying a comparator for any discrimination claim is difficult. See Sullivan, supra note
53, at 216 (observing that “courts continue to develop rules that find most comparator proof insufficient
to create a jury question”); see also Williams et al., supra note 2, at 106–08 (exploring how pregnant
women often lose suits under the PDA due to lack of a comparator).
55. Every circuit that considered the issue held an employer does not violate the PDA by denying
a pregnant employee an accommodation or benefit pursuant to a pregnancy-blind policy. See Serednyj
v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446
F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir.
1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207–08 (5th Cir. 1998); Troupe v. May Dep’t
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
56. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4 RM, 2010 WL 1568606, at
*7 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010) (approving, under the PDA, company policy that only provided restricted
or limited duty to employees with workplace-related injuries or qualified employees with a disability
under the ADA), aff’d, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011).
57. The PDA legislates, in essence, that pregnant employees “are to be treated no worse—nor
any better—than other ‘similar’ workers.” Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 348 (1984–85).
58. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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who are “similar in their ability or inability to work.”59 In Young, UPS had
a policy of providing accommodations to three categories of employees: (1)
employees injured on the job; (2) employees with “a permanent impairment
cognizable” under the ADA; and (3) employees who lose their Department
of Transportation (DOT) certification to drive a commercial motor
vehicle.60 Peggy Young sought a light duty accommodation when her
pregnancy caused a lifting restriction.61 UPS refused because she did not fit
into any of the three categories.62 Young sued, alleging UPS violated the
PDA by failing to provide her the same accommodations it provided to
other non-pregnant employees who fell within one of the three categories
and were similar in their relative ability to work.63
The crux of the dispute before the Supreme Court was whether the
PDA meant one thing or two. It was clear enough that, under the First
Clause, pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination. The question was
what, if anything, the Second Clause added. Young’s argument before the
Supreme Court was that the Second Clause had to mean something more
than the mere redefinition of sex to include pregnancy; otherwise, that part
of the statute would be superfluous.64 Accordingly, Young argued that
where an employer accommodates even a few workers pursuant to a rule or
policy, it must provide similar accommodations to all pregnant workers
with comparable physical limitations.65
UPS’s argument was that the PDA meant essentially one thing.66 In
particular, its argument was that the Second Clause merely gave application
to the First Clause’s redefinition of sex.67 UPS also argued that Young’s
position would mandate special treatment for pregnancy and grant it “most
favored nation” status by entitling pregnancy to better treatment than any
other basis under Title VII.68

59. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2013 WL 1462041,
at *i (framing the question presented as such).
60. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated, 153 S. Ct.
1338.
61. Id. at 440–41.
62. Id.
63. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., Civ. Action No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at
*9 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011), aff’d, 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
64. Petitioner’s Brief at 23–24, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4441528, at
*23–24.
65. Id. at 20, 2014 WL 4441528, at *20.
66. See Brief for Respondent at 9, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 5464086, at
*9 (“The PDA amended Title VII to clarify that traditional anti-discrimination protections apply to
pregnant women. It does not mandate accommodations or other special treatment for pregnant
employees.”).
67. Id. at 27, 2014 WL 5464086, at *27 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983)).
68. Id. at 13, 2014 WL 5465086, at *13.
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The Court characterized these two interpretations as polar opposites
and said that neither was correct.69 It contended that UPS’s claim could not
be correct since it rendered the Second Clause superfluous.70 The Court
said Young’s approach was also not correct since such an interpretation
would run counter to disparate treatment law, which generally allows for
differential treatment of protected class members as long as there is a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.71
The Young Court held that the role of policies, which have the effect of
accommodating some employees but not pregnant ones, is that such
policies can help prove pretext under the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting framework.72 Plaintiffs can argue, for example, that the employer’s
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for such a policy are not very
strong and the policy is a pretext for intentional discrimination.73 A
pregnancy-blind policy can thus be used as circumstantial evidence to infer
intentional discrimination against pregnant employees, especially if the
plaintiff is able to show one or both of the following: (1) that a pregnancyblind policy is not warranted by neutral business reasons, or (2) that the
employer’s policies accommodate a large percentage of nonpregnant
workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant
workers.74 Here, Young departs dramatically from previous case law in that
having a pregnancy-blind accommodation policy is no longer an absolute
defense against a disparate treatment claim.75 Also, the Young court
explicitly stated that cost or inconvenience is typically not a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for failing to add pregnant women to the category
of those whom the employer accommodates.76 However, the holding is still
a far cry from what Young and most amici sought: a guaranteed right to
pregnancy accommodations. Unless Congress now chooses to amend the
PDA, it appears the Supreme Court has closed the door on the statute’s
possible guarantee of accommodation rights.

69. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349.
70. Id. at 1352.
71. Id. at 1350.
72. See id. at 1354 (explaining how such proof would fit into the McDonnell Douglas scheme).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Compare Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338, with Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540,
548–49 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v.
Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138
F.3d 204, 207–08 (5th Cir. 1998); and Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.
1994).
76. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
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iii. The Family and Medical Leave Act
The FMLA fails to ensure pregnancy accommodations due to its very
structure. First, and most fundamentally, it only guarantees up to twelve
weeks of job-protected leave and does not confer a general right to
accommodation.77 If the employee takes the leave intermittently, it may
function like an accommodation by enabling the employee to continue
working by means of a reduced schedule.78 But this is a fairly narrow
accommodation. A second limitation is that the mandated leave is unpaid,79
making the right accessible only to those who can afford to forego
compensation for some amount of time.80 Third, to be eligible, employees
must work for a relatively large company81 and have at least one year with
the company;82 the net result is that the FMLA covers only about 60% of
American workers.83 Altogether, the FMLA in its current form secures very
little in the way of pregnancy accommodations.
B. The Push for Pregnancy Accommodations
A brief chronology shows how the three proposals outlined above have
emerged and helped create a cultural groundswell in support of pregnancy
accommodations. Though scholarly articles dating back to the 1970s have
advocated treating pregnancy as a disability, the amendments to the ADA
in 2008 reignited interest, largely because they expanded the scope of
disability.84 In 2011, Professor Jeannette Cox wrote a well-received article
supporting the categorization of pregnancy as a disability under the ADA.85
Her piece explored the capacity of the ADA to give pregnant employees
the right to accommodation because the Amendments lowered the bar for
proving “disability.”86 Professor Deborah Widiss soon thereafter lent her
77. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2012).
78. Cox, supra note 2, at 455 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (allowing eligible employees to take
intermittent FMLA leave)).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c).
80. Many workers do not take FMLA leave because they cannot afford it. See DAVID CANTOR ET
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS: THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS, 2000 UPDATE § 3.2.1 (2004).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (defining “employer” as one who “employs 50 or more employees
for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year”).
82. Id. § 2611(2)(A) (defining “eligible employee” as one who has been employed by the
employer through whom the leave is requested for at least one year).
83. Cox, supra note 2, at 457 (observing that “only fifty-seven to sixty-six percent of American
workers are FMLA-eligible”).
84. See generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
85. Cox, supra note 2, at 449–51.
86. Id. at 460.
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ideas to how pregnancy accommodations might be more consistently
achieved. She argued that the legislative history of the PDA supported a
stronger right to accommodation than courts had found.87 Widiss argued
that although the PDA does not require pregnancy accommodations in
general, it does require them in any instance where the employer has
accommodated, or would be required to accommodate, any limitations
similar to those caused by pregnancy.88 The idea of pregnant employees
needing the right to reasonable accommodations soon found a larger
audience as the press and advocacy organizations publicized the issue.89
News reports of sympathetic pregnant workers who were denied simple
and inexpensive accommodations garnered public support for
accommodating pregnant workers.90
Shortly after the Young case was decided in March of 2015, Congress
reintroduced the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, a bill intended to provide
pregnant workers with stand-alone accommodation rights.91 The legislation
makes it unlawful to deny reasonable accommodations for pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions, unless the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the business.92 Reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship are said to have the same meanings as they do under
the ADA.93 Indeed, the bill reads much like the ADA—only it is pregnant
employees being given the right to accommodation. Additionally, a
plethora of states have jumped on the bandwagon for pregnancy
accommodations.94
In sum, the ADA, PDA, and FMLA do not provide an affirmative right
to pregnancy accommodations. In response, advocates have argued for
ADA coverage, PDA coverage, and an independent law entitling pregnant
workers to accommodations. The next section will revisit, in light of these
proposals, the debate regarding whether sexual equality in the workplace is
best achieved by symmetrical or asymmetrical rights.95 Examining the
PDA’s passage is instructive because the PDA implicated many of the

87. Widiss, supra note 4, at 997.
88. Id. at 965.
89. E.g., Cox, supra note 34; Reese, supra note 34.
90. E.g., Cox, supra note 34; Martin, supra note 11.
91. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 1512, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2654, 114th Cong.
(2015).
92. S. 1512 § 2(1).
93. Id. § 5(5).
94. See supra note 12.
95. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987)
(distinguishing between symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches as two conflicting visions of sexual
equality); Williams, supra note 30 (explicating what unites and divides sex equality “symmetrists” from
“asymmetrists”).
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same social issues at stake in the current discourse over pregnancy
accommodations.
C. The PDA and Gender-Symmetrical Rights
History suggests that there are risks to legislating sex-based
distinctions on behalf of women in the workplace. In the early 1900s, at
least twenty-five states had some form of protective labor laws for female
workers.96 There were general restrictions limiting the amount of hours
women could work, prohibiting night work, and excluding women from
hazardous occupations.97 There were also specific restrictions, such as
those issuing from the Department of Labor’s recommendation in the early
1940s that pregnant women not work six weeks before and two months
after delivery;98 many states thus adopted laws prohibiting companies from
employing women for a period of time both before and after childbirth.99
Finally, there were preferential laws that granted benefits to female workers
that men did not enjoy, including special lunches and rest breaks.100
These measures benefited many women by improving working
conditions, but these measures also came with costs: they reinforced
stereotypes of women’s physical weakness and, as a matter of social norms,
helped tie women’s worth more to home and family than to the
employment sector.101 Accentuating the physiological distinctions between
male and female workers also led in some cases to outright discrimination
by employers102 and enraged many women who fought against sex-specific
laws by trying to ensure women would have equal work opportunities.103

96. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae at 12–13, Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728369, at *12–13 [hereinafter
ACLU Brief].
97. Id. at 13, 1986 WL 728369, at *13.
98. Williams, supra note 57, at 334 (citing WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL.
NO. 240, MATERNITY PROTECTION OF EMPLOYED WOMEN 7 (1952)).
99. Id.
100. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 13, 1986 WL 728369, at *13.
101. See id. at 17–18, 1986 WL 728369, at *17–18 (“The notion of biologically-based
difference, so essential to protectionism, fueled a pervasive ideology which relegated women to a
separate sphere of home and family.”).
102. For example, historian Deborah Dinner has written about how, in the 1960s, employers
routinely fired pregnant workers without regard to whether they could continue working. Deborah
Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 452–53 (2011).
103. See Widiss, supra note 4, at 983–84 (“[The National Organization for Women (NOW)]
contended that even seemingly salutary laws hurt women by reinforcing stereotypes regarding women’s
need for protection and making women less attractive as employees.”).
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Such laws “‘protected’ women out of good jobs”104 and led many
employers to simply fire women who became pregnant.105 Accordingly,
some women’s rights activists argued that equality of opportunity did not
mean women needed special rights or paternalism to manage their
reproductive and maternal needs.106
Certainly, this was not the only view of how conditions like pregnancy
should be treated. The question of how best to treat conditions like
pregnancy, which accentuate women’s physical differences, provoked
profound disagreement in the debates leading up to the PDA’s passage.107
Some feminist litigators and scholars argued for special treatment, or an
approach that would accommodate pregnancy regardless how other
workers were treated.108 And since the ability to become pregnant is an
obvious asymmetry between men and women, some took the position that
an asymmetrical solution was warranted.109 Still, this was far from the
consensus view.110
For example, in a Supreme Court brief written almost thirty years ago,
the American Civil Liberties Union, the League of Women Voters, and the
National Women’s Political Caucus argued that laws which extend
preferential rights on the basis of pregnancy “reinforce stereotypes about
women’s inclinations and abilities; they deter employers from hiring
women of childbearing age or funnel them into less responsible positions;
and they make women appear to be more expensive, less reliable
employees.”111 Moreover, in the wake of the PDA, women’s rights activists
opposed state-based measures to give pregnancy special job-protected
leave. They argued this type of treatment was disadvantageous for women
104. Id. at 982; see also Williams, supra note 57, at 333 (noting that legislative efforts from the
1930s and ’40s that supported women’s “maternal function” had the adverse effect of excluding them
from certain jobs).
105. Williams, supra note 57, at 335.
106. See Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for
Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 210 (1998) (describing how, by 1970, the vast
majority of feminists were “on the formal equality bandwagon”); Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by
Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1, 3–6 (2009) (describing a steadily growing coalition of equal treatment activists in the
1960s and ’70s).
107. See Dinner, supra note 49, at 518 (“In the 1970s, the campaign for the PDA had contained
the tension between anti-stereotyping and neomaternal commitments.”); see also Brake & Grossman,
supra note 4, at 78.
108. See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513,
537–57 (1983).
109. See id.
110. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 4, at 78 (observing there were differing approaches for
how best to achieve equality for women when it came to the issue of pregnancy).
111. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 7, 1986 WL 728369, at *7 (opposing a law which required
that women temporarily incapacitated as a result of pregnancy receive up to four months unpaid leave
time along with job security).
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“because it spurred ex ante discrimination against women and reinforced
stereotypes that women are only marginal workers.”112
These types of arguments partially explain why Congress rejected
pregnancy-based distinctions when it passed the PDA in 1978.113 Of
course, employers, and their resistance to measures that limit their
autonomy to structure the workplace, also played a significant role.114
Indeed, employer attitudes were explicitly accounted for through the
concerns about stereotyping and were a part of why equal rights feminists
opined that special treatment was not the best way to achieve sexual
equality in the workplace.115
The PDA was passed to be a strong guarantor of negative rights (i.e.,
antidiscrimination)116 as well as the same positive rights that similarly
situated employees receive.117 This means that if an employer allows some
employees to leave work early to take their children to athletic
competitions, an employer must likely allow pregnant employees to leave
work early for pregnancy-related purposes. But if an employer is generally
unaccommodating to its employees, a pregnant employee has no more
rights than anyone else;118 pregnant employees “are to be treated no
worse—nor any better—than other ‘similar’ workers.”119 In this way, the
PDA can be seen as a legislative judgment that the best way to secure sex
equality is through the extension of gender-symmetrical rights.120
112. Widiss, supra note 4, at 999–1000; see also ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 14, 1986 WL
728369, at *14. “As a result of the stereotypes reflected in protective legislation,” women were denied
the right to practice law, administer estates, and bartend. Id. at 16–17, 1986 WL 728369, at *16–17.
113. See ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 6–7, 11, 1986 WL *6–7, *11 (“It is not just
happenstance that the PDA embraced this approach and rejected any separate or distinct legal category
for pregnancy. The history of working women in America, and the legal efforts to institutionalize their
differential treatment, make plain that Congress had ample reasons for legislating as it did.”); Williams,
supra note 57, at 347–48 (observing that Congress, in passing the PDA and “quite plainly requiring that
pregnancy be treated under the equality model,” was responding to the arguments made by women’s
rights advocates about how pregnancy ought to be treated).
114. Dinner, supra note 49, at 457 (observing the “business lobby deployed liberal individualist
discourse to legitimate concepts of free contract and private ordering” during debates over the PDA); id.
at 516 (noting that the PDA represented a statutory compromise for all sides, including the business
lobby).
115. Williams, supra note 57, at 352.
116. The PDA was clear that pregnancy discrimination was by definition sex discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). This meant that traditional employment policies requiring terminations of
pregnant workers or mandatory leaves were prima facie sex discrimination and thus illegal.
117. See supra notes 49–75 and accompanying text for more discussion on what positive rights
are guaranteed in the wake of the Young decision.
118. Michelle A. Travis, The PDA’s Causation Effect: Observations of an Unreasonable
Woman, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 52 (2009) (arguing one deficiency of the PDA is that it does not
require employers to modify exclusionary norms in the workplaces).
119. Williams, supra note 57, at 348.
120. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 6, 1986 WL 728369, at *6 (“The PDA embodies the
legislative judgment that women will secure equality, equity and greater tangible benefits when legal
distinctions based on sex and pregnancy are eliminated, and when the similarities in the rights and
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The concerns regarding special treatment for women cannot now be
quickly dismissed. While much has changed since the PDA’s passage,
pregnancy discrimination is, by all indications, still a problem.121 This
should give us pause about the proposals outlined above since, as will be
explained in Part II, each has the capacity to actually increase pregnancy
discrimination and weaken women’s stature in the workplace.
II. THE EXPRESSIVE HARMS OF PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION REFORM
Laws do more than secure material rights and constrain malfeasance.
They reflect social values and send messages to the public about both what
society should value and how the relevant subject should be valued.122 In
light of law’s expressive capacity, not every approach will be acceptable in
terms of the messages sent.123 Accordingly, even though determining the
expressive meaning of a particular action is complex,124 we ought to
consider the expressive potential of any proposed law or policy reform.
This part will first consider the general nature of expressive harms, and
then the social meanings associated with pregnancy, disability, and
workplace accommodations—and how each implicates the perceived
capacity to work. These strands of inquiry, woven together, are the starting
point for understanding why laws securing pregnancy-specific
accommodations may have a negative expressive impact for all women.
A. Expressive Harms Generally
The expressive function of law refers to how laws affect behavior in
ways other than explicit sanctions.125 As noted above, laws do not merely
affect behavior by force; they signal certain values and cause people to
internalize those values.126 Laws are pervasively expressive127 in that laws
are rife with social signals and meanings.128
needs of both sexes are seen to override their differences.”); Williams, supra note 57, at 347–48
(observing that the PDA required “pregnancy be treated under the equality model”).
121. See, e.g., The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES,
1–2 (Oct. 2013), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/pregnancydiscrimination/the-pregnancy-discrimination-act-at-35.pdf (“Pregnancy discrimination complaints are
actually on the rise, particularly among women in lower-wage jobs and among women of color.”).
122. It is similar to the military’s distinction between “hard power” and “soft power”—with
expressive theory representing soft power and the various ways that laws provide mechanisms for
constraining behavior as hard power.
123. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1504, 1564 (noting expressive theories of law are
“deeply concerned” with “the form of the law” being appropriate).
124. Id. at 1527 (acknowledging the complexity of determining “expressive meaning”).
125. Geisinger, supra note 16, at 40–41; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–51 (2000).
126. See Lessig, supra note 14; Stein, supra note 14; Sunstein, supra note 14.
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A law’s expression may include positive or appropriate
characterizations. For example, murder and manslaughter laws provide that
acting in self-defense is an affirmative defense; the structure of such laws
sends a message to society that self-defense—even self-defense that results
in the death of another—is acceptable under certain circumstances.
Similarly, the ADA signals strongly that people with disabilities should be
integrated and not segregated.129 In this way, the ADA may impact how
persons with disabilities see themselves and interact with others.130
Conversely, a law’s expression may include negative or inappropriate
characterizations and, as a result, inflict expressive or stigmatic harms on
an individual or group.131 Southern laws in the 1950s and 1960s authorizing
racial segregation provide an example of expressive harm. Requiring the
racial segregation of public facilities inflicted expressive harms in part
because doing so while providing better facilities for whites sent the
message that non-whites were inferior.132 Such a law manifested a harmful
message even if, for example, black people could still find food or
lodging.133 In other words, the expressive harm resulted from the fact that
the expression conveyed inappropriate or negative attitudes about the
affected group.134
A government’s expressions can send particularly strong signals about
what social norms should be.135 Indeed, “most of the purposes, beliefs,
attitudes, intentions, and other mental states that individuals can have on
their own can also be properly attributed to groups, including the State.”136
Expressive theories of a particular action do not depend upon the
expressing agents’ intentions137 or upon the understanding of the group or
individual to whom the expression pertains.138 Instead, expressive theories
depend upon the “public meanings” associated with the expression.139 This
127. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1504.
128. Geisinger, supra note 16, at 40–41.
129. Consider, for example, the statements of Senators Harkin and Kennedy at the time the ADA
was passed that it was an “emancipation proclamation” for people with disabilities. 136 CONG. REC.
17,369 (1990) (statement of Senator Harkin); 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Senator
Kennedy).
130. See DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY
IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 102 (2003) (recounting the story of Barry
Swygert and how the ADA transformed his self-perception and helped him “reconstitute his identity”).
131. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1527–28.
132. Id. at 1528, 1543.
133. Id. at 1542.
134. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting the expressive harms of
segregation in public schools).
135. Geisinger, supra note 16, at 37–44.
136. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1504.
137. Id. at 1523–24; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 2050.
138. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1525.
139. Id. at 1524, 1527.
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means the expressive signals mesh with and influence existing social
norms.140 The expressive meaning of a law may also have material
consequences. In particular, laws may impact whether people approve of
certain behaviors as well as whether they feel that others approve.141 A law
may thus set, change, or reinforce social meanings, which may in turn yield
other real-world consequences.
To carefully consider any potential expressive harms or impacts
associated with pregnancy accommodation proposals will first require
consideration of the social norms associated with pregnancy, disability, and
workplace accommodations; these subjects are most squarely implicated by
pregnancy accommodation reform. Of course, space limitations preclude
anything but partial narratives. With that in mind, this Article will focus on
the way in which each of their respective social meanings implicate the
perceived capacity to work. With some grasp on the social meanings of
pregnancy, disability, and accommodations, this Article will then examine
how pregnancy accommodation reforms are likely to influence these
existing cultural norms as well as the ultimate goal of sexual equality in the
workplace.
B. Social Meanings of Pregnancy (& Work)
Over the last fifty years, pregnancy has evolved from being seen as
deforming and shameful to being understood as healthy and compatible
with productive work.142 Early literature portrayed pregnancy as a
deformity.143 Pregnant women stayed out of the public and were
encouraged to remain indoors and get rest.144 In the 1950s, the Federal
Communications Commission and broadcast executives did not allow TV
shows to even use the word “pregnant.”145 Just a few decades ago, it was

140. Id. at 1525 (observing that expressive meanings are constructed by either fitting—or failing
to fit with—other meaningful norms and practices in a community).
141. Geisinger, supra note 16, at 45.
142. See KELLY OLIVER, KNOCK ME UP, KNOCK ME DOWN: IMAGES OF PREGNANCY IN
HOLLYWOOD FILMS 1–3, 20–22 (2012); Lauren Berlant, America, “Fat,” the Fetus, 21 BOUNDARY 2
145, 146 (1994) (“Once a transgressive revelation of a woman’s sacred and shameful carnality, the
pictorial display of pregnancy is now an eroticized norm in American public culture.”). While the
various mechanisms for achieving pregnancy’s new status are complicated and include legal, political,
and media machinery, pregnancy’s cultural shift over the decades is without much doubt.
This section does not contend that any positive shift in valuing pregnancy is unique only to the present
moment. There has certainly been vacillation over time in how pregnancy is viewed, making future
changes possible.
143. CRISTINA MAZZONI, MATERNAL IMPRESSIONS: PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH IN THEORY
AND LITERATURE 131–39 (2002).
144. OLIVER, supra note 142, at 1, 24.
145. RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE
POLITICS IN AMERICA 163 (2005).
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improper to use the word “pregnant” in polite company; instead, people
employed various euphemisms, such as “expecting,” “with child,” and “a
bun in the oven.”146 Part of this cultural quietness about pregnancy
stemmed from modesty, as well as the notion that pregnancy advertised the
fact that a woman had been sexually active.147 For example, Adrienne Rich
recounted how a school rescinded her invitation to lecture in 1955 when the
headmaster discovered she was pregnant.148 The headmaster told Rich that
her pregnancy “would make it impossible for the boys to listen to [her]
poetry.”149
Consistent with these mid-twentieth century social views, early laws
treated pregnancy and maternal capacity as conditions antagonistic to
employment.150 As discussed above, lawmakers sought to accommodate a
woman’s ability to bear children by limiting the amount that pregnant
women could work and by excluding women from certain hazardous
occupations.151 With such laws and concomitant employer
discrimination,152 pregnancy increasingly became a harbinger of
disengagement from the workplace.153
Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, social views about pregnancy and its
relationship to work began to gradually shift.154 Part of this change resulted
from the publication of Our Bodies, Ourselves, a 1971 book featuring
pictures that framed pregnant women as beautiful.155 However, it was not
until 1991, when a pregnant Demi Moore posed nude on the cover of
Vanity Fair, that the celebration of the pregnant body reached a
crescendo.156 The media now treats pregnancy more like a chic accessory
than a rite of passage in which women must recede socially.157

146. OLIVER, supra note 142, at 26–27.
147. Id. at 27; SOLINGER, supra note 145, at 163 (observing the word “pregnant” was, in the
mid-twentieth century, “apparently too strongly physical and too crudely sexual”).
148. OLIVER, supra note 142, at 27.
149. Id.
150. See Widiss, supra note 4, at 981–82 (discussing the measures taken to “protect” working
women and how they did not facilitate work by pregnant employees); Williams, supra note 57, at 333–
35.
151. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 102, 112 and accompanying text.
153. Williams, supra note 57, at 335, 352.
154. OLIVER, supra note 142, at 21.
155. Id. at 21–22.
156. MEREDITH NASH, MAKING ‘POSTMODERN’ MOTHERS: PREGNANT EMBODIMENT, BABY
BUMPS AND BODY IMAGE 6 (2012) (“The 1991 Vanity Fair cover photograph of naked and heavilypregnant American actress Demi Moore is widely regarded as having reconfigured western cultural
views of pregnancy.”); OLIVER, supra note 142, at 22 (“With Demi Moore’s nude glistening pregnant
belly on the cover of Vanity Fair in 1991, a new era of sexy glamour pregnancy began.”); id. at 36–37;
cf. NASH, supra, at 92 (observing that up until the 1980s in the US, “pregnant women were generally
perceived as asexual”).
157. OLIVER, supra note 142, at 37.
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Almost in sync with these developments was a growing acceptance of
women (and pregnant women) as workers. From the 1950s onward, women
“swelled the labor force,”158 and by 1970, women had an unprecedented
presence in the workforce.159 Also, divorce rates soared in the 1970s, a time
when child support was virtually nonexistent.160 This meant more women
of all classes and races needed employment to support their families.161
Around this same time, women claimed more sexual freedom, as well as
the right to determine whether a pregnancy should lead to the birth of a
child.162 In 1973, the Supreme Court handed down Roe v. Wade, a decision
that gave women even greater autonomy as workers, because a pregnancy
no longer necessitated leaving the workplace for birth and recovery.163
There was an increasing sense that our laws should treat pregnancy “as the
dignified condition of a dignified woman.”164 These changing social norms
accompanied the PDA’s passage in 1978, which both “reflected and
protected an enormous status change for women.”165
In the wake of more sexualized and work-compatible pregnancies,
society started to view pregnancy as both healthy and natural.166 Popular
pregnancy literature now abounds with claims that the understanding of
pregnancy as illness has passed.167 For example, the popular guide What to
Expect When You’re Expecting states: “the concept of pregnancy as an
illness, and of the pregnant woman as an invalid . . . is as dated as general
anesthesia in routine deliveries.”168
The evolution of social norms regarding pregnancy is certainly not all
positive169 and “maternal bias” persists.170 The point of this section is not to
fully describe the Western development of pregnancy norms. Rather, the
objective is to show that pregnancy has evolved from being seen as a
condition antagonistic with work to one that is now seen as compatible.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

SOLINGER, supra note 145, at 212.
Williams, supra note 57, at 335.
SOLINGER, supra note 145, at 212.
Id.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HARRIET GROSS & HELEN PATTISON, SANCTIONING PREGNANCY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE PARADOXES AND CULTURE OF RESEARCH 2 (2007).
167. MAZZONI, supra note 143, at 132.
168. Id. (quoting SANDEE EISENBERG HATHAWAY, HEIDI EISENBERG MURKOFF, & ARLENE
EISENBERG, WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU’RE EXPECTING 189–90 (1991)).
169. For example, it appears that part of what precipitated a growing acceptance of pregnant
women as employees was the ability for people to see them as objects of sexual desire. To that extent,
the success of pregnant workers might be seen as trading on sexual capital.
170. Williams et al., supra note 2, at 102–03 & nn.22–25 (citing studies as support and defining
maternal bias to include both descriptive bias (“assumptions about how mothers will behave”) and
prescriptive bias (“a belief that pregnant women and mothers do not belong in the workplace at all”)).
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Indeed, there has been steady progress over the last several decades
resulting in the idea that pregnant women are capable of productive work
and that pregnancy should not derail a burgeoning career. These
developments are reflected in the fact that women now make up 47% of the
U.S. workforce.171 We must thus carefully consider how to preserve the
perceived compatibility between pregnancy and work. Whatever we say
about pregnancy accommodations, it should be with a mind toward
underlining the view that pregnant women are capable of remaining
productive members of the workforce.
C. Social Meanings of Disability (& Work)
At the outset it is worth noting that disability is a broad term, which
can make it difficult to generalize. Some conditions are not very
stigmatized, and some are stigmatized more than others. Further, not all
conditions we think of today as disabilities have been seen that way
historically. For example, dwarfism, deafness, and eating disorders all have
fascinating histories where in certain cultures and at certain times these
conditions were not seen as disabilities.172 Still, the social meaning of many
conditions falling within the ambit of disability has long had negative
contours.173
Early Greeks and Romans believed people with disabilities embodied
the wrath of gods and should be killed.174 The people of the middle ages
saw disability as a sign of demonic affiliation.175 This interest, which
disproportionately affected those with mental illnesses, culminated in a
“witch craze” that resulted in the executions of many people.176 During the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, disabled persons were, perhaps less

171. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A
DATABOOK 2 (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf.
172. See generally Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347
(2011).
173. For example, at the Society for Disability Studies 1998 annual meeting, Paul Longmore, a
luminary in the field of disability studies, asked, “Does disability ever represent anything other than a
negative image?” David T. Mitchell & Sharon L. Snyder, Representation and Its Discontents: The
Uneasy Home of Disability in Literature and Film, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 195, 195
(Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine D. Seelman & Michael Bury eds., 2001); see also The Disability Rights
Movement: A Brief History, in DISABILITY: THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL DEBATE 137, 137
(Robert M. Baird, Stuart E. Rosenbaum & S. Kay Toombs eds., 2009) (“Historically, the condition of
having a disability—in any society—has been viewed as tragic.”).
174. David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, An Institutional History of Disability, in HANDBOOK
OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 173, at 11, 12, 14–17.
175. Id. at 18.
176. Id. at 17–18.
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invidiously, seen as a menace to economic wellbeing.177 The nineteenth and
twentieth centuries saw the rise and expansion of mental institutions, in
which people with all sorts of disabilities were segregated from the rest of
society.178 The twentieth century oversaw a eugenics movement and
concomitant sterilizations.179 Throughout, “disability” has been frequently
“equated with ‘flawed’ minds and bodies.”180
Contemporary commentators have been hopeful for new laws to result
in a more positive meaning for disability. From the time the Rehabilitation
Act was passed in 1973 to the recent amendments to the ADA,
commentators have proclaimed that such disability-specific laws were
intended to foster inclusion and erase the stigmatic social norms long
associated with the meaning of disability.181
These aspirations sometimes blend together with proclamations that the
Social Model of Disability (“Social Model”) has acquired or will acquire
cultural resonance.182 Here, a little background is instructive. The
conventional narrative is that the Medical Model of Disability (“Medical
Model”)—in which disability is understood as a medical problem requiring
a medical solution—has predominated for centuries.183 The Social Model
asserts that disability is culturally constructed and comprised principally of
social conventions that can be remedied.184 The most common example of
177. Id. at 13 (“The practices of auctioning off the care of disabled persons to the highest bidder
or running them out of town with threatened or real violence reflected an intimate connection between
poverty and disability in this period of history.”).
178. Id. at 13, 29–42.
179. Id. at 38–40.
180. See COLIN BARNES & GEOF MERCER, DISABILITY 1 (2003) (observing this is true for most
of the twentieth century).
181. See, e.g., Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for
Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J., no. 1, 2013, at 1, 42 (arguing that, with the
passage of the ADAAA, disability “is therefore not stigmatizing—at long last, it is something broadly
shared”); Adrienne L. Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral
Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1452 (1994) (“The purpose of Title I of the ADA, which affects both
public and private employers, is to transform the notion of what constitutes an ‘able’ body or a
‘qualified’ worker and to change the social consequences of a disability by integrating disabled workers
into, rather than excluding them from, the workplace. . . . The ADA reconfigures our norms of physical
capability at the same time that it revises our vision of America, guaranteeing equal political and
economic rights to a population traditionally excluded from full participation in American public life.”);
ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 130, at 116–22 (arguing the ADA challenges the history of disability
stigma); see also Bonnie G. Smith, Introduction, in GENDERING DISABILITY 1 (Bonnie G. Smith &
Beth Hutchison eds., 2004) (“Gone are the days of a simple and dominant physiological or medical
definition of disability. Instead, people have come to see an art of disability . . . .”).
182. E.g., Rienk Prins, Preventing Job Abandonment and Facilitating Work Reintegration in
High-Income Countries, in DISABILITY AND EQUITY AT WORK 242, 248 (Jody Heymann, Michael
Ashley Stein & Gonzalo Moreno eds., 2014) (arguing “the social model of disability has by now been
predominant for years,” reflects changing attitudes toward disability, and is being increasingly
integrated into policy).
183. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the Medical
Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 183 (2008).
184. See generally Areheart, supra note 172 (discussing in depth the Social Model of Disability).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2534216

5 AREHEART 1125-1177 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/19/2016 1:46 PM

Accommodating Pregnancy

1151

this view is the way in which stairs “disable” those with mobility
impairments, whereas ramps are more accessible to all (including senior
citizens and small children) and result in more people who are “able” to
access such a building.185 In this situation, a person is disabled, or made
able, at least in part by factors outside of the person’s own body.
Exclusionary factors may, under the Social Model, include physical,
institutional, and attitudinal barriers.186 The claim then would be that the
Social Model has modified the social meaning of disability.187
Ultimately, and notwithstanding the work of ardent disability advocates
to reshape the way we think and talk about disability, it is difficult to
measure whether there has been much change in disability’s social
meaning. Moreover, there are reasons to be skeptical that the average
person now understands disability as more culturally contingent or as
something other than a condition to be avoided.188 Perhaps the best
indication of social views on disability is found in statistical measures of
employment189 and media representations of people with disabilities.190
The expressive meaning of disability most relevant for this Article’s
discussion is disability’s potential to signal inability to work.191 The current
employment rate for people with disabilities is a strong indication of
whether society perceives disability as compatible with working.192 This
rate has always been low, but the current employment rate of less than 20%

185. Id. at 351 n.11.
186. Areheart, supra note 183, at 188.
187. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
188. Almost fifteen years after the ADA had passed, there was little evidence that the major
philosophical underpinnings of the ADA had taken hold in the national consciousness. Laura L. Rovner,
Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1086 (2004).
189. See Stein, supra note 24, at 1152 (“One way to gauge whether social and economic
empowerment has increased for people with disabilities after the ADA’s passage is to examine their
employment experiences.”).
190. See BETH A. HALLER, REPRESENTING DISABILITY IN AN ABLEIST WORLD: ESSAYS ON
MASS MEDIA iv (2010) (“Researchers can delineate the characteristics of a particular culture by
investigating the content of its mass media. ‘The basic assumption is that both changes and regularities
in media content reliably reflect or report some feature of the social reality of the moment.’”); PAMELA
J. SHOEMAKER & STEPHEN D. REESE, MEDIATING THE MESSAGE: THEORIES OF INFLUENCES ON MASS
MEDIA CONTENT 24 (1991) (“If we assume that the media provide most of the ‘reality’ that people
know outside their own personal experience, then studying media content surely helps us assess what
reality it is that they consume. . . . Systematic, patterned regularities in content result from stable,
underlying structural factors.”).
191. Stein, supra note 24, at 1178 (observing the belief that people with disabilities are
“inauthentic workers” is “[p]erhaps the most damaging aspect” of social conventions that equate
disability with less ability).
192. Research in this area has indicated a notable “discrepancy between expressed attitude and
behavior.” Brigida Hernandez, Fabricio E. Balcazar & Christopher B. Keys, Disability Rights: Attitudes
of Private and Public Sector Representatives, 70 J. REHAB. 28, 29 (2004). In particular, “employers’
expressed willingness to hire workers with disabilities has been incongruent with their actual hiring.”
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2534216

5 AREHEART 1125-1177 (DO NOT DELETE)

1152

Alabama Law Review

4/19/2016 1:46 PM

[Vol. 67:4:1125

is, in recent history, an historic low.193 Even if people’s perceptions of
disability are not responsible for this low rate, the low rate itself may
perpetuate a perceived incompatibility between disability and work.
Similarly, even when people with disabilities find work, it is usually lowstatus or low-compensation work.194 This means that whatever
compatibilities between disability and work that exist are less visible.
Mass media representations of disabled individuals have long had a
strong effect on how people understand disability.195 The media portrayal
of disability is powerful. Studies have shown and commentators have
claimed that media is the primary way non-disabled persons learn about
disability196 and that it even influences “brass-tack issues,” such as
unemployment, health care policy, and self-esteem.197 Researchers have
devoted entire books to examining media representations of disability,198

193. The current employment rate of people with disabilities is historically low, with February
2016 numbers showing employment rates of 19.5% for people with disabilities, and 68.2% for people
without disabilities. OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/odep/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2016). This is hard to measure exactly as different federal agencies have, over time,
used different definitions of disability. S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 113TH
CONG., UNFINISHED BUSINESS: MAKING EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES A NATIONAL
PRIORITY 6, 30 (2012), http://www.ct.gov/dds/lib/dds/community/cms_guidance_around_sheltered_
workshops.pdf [hereinafter UNFINISHED BUSINESS]; Stein et al., supra note 31, at 733.
194. See Jody Heymann, Michael Ashley Stein & Gonzalo Moreno, Disability, Employment, and
Inclusion Worldwide, in DISABILITY AND EQUITY AT WORK, supra note 182, at 1, 5 (observing workers
with disabilities are much more likely to be in part time positions and earn lower wages than their
comparable colleagues without disabilities); Lauren Lindstrom & Laurie Gutmann Kahn, Career
Advancement for Young Adults with Disabilities, in DISABILITY AND EQUITY AT WORK, supra, at 213,
216–17 (observing that career advancement for people with disabilities is burdened both by patterns of
discrimination and lack of access to “specific skill training” or needed education).
195. PAUL T. JAEGER & CYNTHIA ANN BOWMAN, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: INCLUSION,
ACCESS, DIVERSITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 100 (2005) (examining the influence the media’s portrayal of
disability has on public perception). Indeed, much of what we know about any subject comes from what
we see on television or in the movies. Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler’s
Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 223 (2000); HALLER, supra note 190, at iv.
196. JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND
EMPOWERMENT 35 (1998) (observing that surveys have shown that more people form attitudes about
disabilities from television (telethons) than from any other source); HALLER, supra note 190, at iv (“I
argue that most non-disabled people still learn about disability issues through the media, rather than
through interactions with people with disabilities.”); OTTO F. WAHL, MEDIA MADNESS: PUBLIC IMAGES
OF MENTAL ILLNESS 3 (1995).
197. CHARLES A. RILEY II, DISABILITY AND THE MEDIA: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 1 (2005).
198. See generally MARTIN F. NORDEN, THE CINEMA OF ISOLATION: A HISTORY OF PHYSICAL
DISABILITY IN THE MOVIES (1994); RILEY II, supra note 197; WAHL, supra note 196. For book chapters
and articles that examine media representations of disability, see PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED
MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 131–46 (2003); Areheart, supra note 172; Gerard
Goggin & Christopher Newell, Fame and Disability: Christopher Reeve, Super Crips, and Infamous
Celebrity, in DISABILITY: THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL DEBATE, supra note 173, at 105;
Mitchell & Snyder, supra note 173; Robert Molsberry, More Than an Inspiration, in DISABILITY: THE
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL DEBATE, supra note 173, at 117; William J. Peace, Wishing for
Kryptonite: A Response to Christopher Reeve’s Pursuit of Cure, in DISABILITY: THE SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL DEBATE, supra note 173, at 127; John Schatzlein, Christopher Reeve: 1952–
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and nearly all of the literature indicates these representations have been
negative.199
In all forms of media, disability is often presented as a “defective” or
inferior status.200 It is situated as an individual, medical problem requiring
an individualized, medical solution;201 prejudice and discrimination rarely
enter into such stories.202 The media and other nonfiction typically present
disability as deserving of great pity, or as a condition that is unacceptable
and something that needs to be overcome by the individual or science.203
Disability in novels and other fictional works is often intended to show
malevolence, in which “deformity of body symbolizes deformity of
soul.”204 Similarly, disabled characters are often isolated from their ablebodied peers and objectified through the lenses of pity, fear, and scorn.205
Just as important is the glaring lack of positive portrayals; people with
disabilities are rarely shown as independent, contented, or employed.206
Such negative representations inform not only a collective social view but
2004, in DISABILITY: THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL DEBATE, supra note 173, at 131; John
Williams, Christopher Reeve’s Super Bowl Ad Scored a Touchdown: But It Has Provoked a
Surprisingly Negative Reaction Among Disbled Groups. Why?, in DISABILITY: THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL,
AND ETHICAL DEBATE, supra note 173, at 123.
199. See infra notes 200–206 and accompanying text; see also HALLER, supra note 190, at iii
(“The ableism within media content presents people with disabilities as inferior to able-bodied people,
as ‘defective’ or as having a worthless status.”). However, there have been some positive portrayals in
commercials that, in a commercial pitch to the disability niche, portray people with handicaps as
“attractive, active, and ‘with it.’” LONGMORE, supra note 198, at 145; HALLER, supra note 190, at 193–
204; RILEY II, supra note 197, at 2. Such portrayals have been the exception—not the norm.
200. HALLER, supra note 190, at iii.
201. LONGMORE, supra note 198, at 139–40; RILEY II, supra note 197, at 4, 12 (observing that
the distinction between the Medical and Social Models of Disability “is of paramount importance to an
understanding of the media and disability”).
202. LONGMORE, supra note 198, at 139–40.
203. There are three forms of “prefabricated stories” about disability: the supercrip (in which the
person triumphs over their condition), the medical miracle (in which science triumphs over their
condition), and the object of pity. RILEY II, supra note 198, at x, 4; LONGMORE, supra note 198, at 138–
39 (characterizing the nonfiction presentation of handicapped individuals as a matter of “heroic
overcoming”). Many of the media’s characterizations of disability have traditionally coincided with
emphases on pity and the need for medical treatment—notions that are at home with the Medical
Model. Such characterizations, even when they are well-meaning, undercut the social understanding of
people with disabilities as being capable of productive work. Areheart, supra note 183, at 201–04; see
also Kevin Barry, Gray Matters: Autism, Impairment, and the End of Binaries, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
161, 178–79 (2012) (discussing “I Am Autism” ad campaign launched by Autism Speaks, an autism
advocacy organization, which relied on “[t]ime-tested pity and fear tactics”).
204. LONGMORE, supra note 198, at 133–34 (arguing that among the most persistent uses of
disability in popular entertainment and literature is “the association of disability with malevolence” and
then chronicling examples); NORDEN, supra note 198, at 5–6 (chronicling examples); Mitchell &
Snyder, supra note 173, at 196 (same).
205. NORDEN, supra note 198, at 1.
206. Mitchell & Snyder, supra note 173, at 196 (“Truly, literary and historical texts have rarely
appeared to offer disabled characters in developed, ‘positive’ portraits.”); see Areheart, supra note 183,
at 197 (examining Million Dollar Baby, a movie in which the protagonist, upon becoming disabled,
begs to be euthanized, comparing herself to a sick dog that needs to be taken out into the woods and
shot).
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also the perceptions of individual employers who must abide by the
provisions of the ADA.207
While questions about causation may shroud the media’s role in
affecting social views on disability, it is probably fair to identify the
relationship between disability and the media as a mutually causal one; the
media simultaneously reflects and undermines the position in society of
people with disabilities.208
Moreover, while “disability” is sometimes a term of art that means
different things depending upon the legal context, the commonly
understood semantics of the word “disability” communicate incapacity or
lack of ability.209 Further, the expressive contours of “disability” are more
than an issue of language or semantics. Treating disability and
employability as binary conditions has been an enduring distributive
mechanism to sort the population into groups who are able and expected to
work and those who are not able to work.210 Indeed, this either–or construct
dates back to the Elizabethan poor laws,211 which grew out of fourteenthcentury edicts intended to address vagrancy.212 Disability thus originated as
a public status that was defined by whether a person was able to work.213
Indeed, the modern embodiment of the disability–employability distinction
is found in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) definitions, which
regulate who may receive benefits pursuant to Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).214 Here,
disability is defined as an inability to work.215
The next section will explore a topic that is closely related to, but
ultimately discrete from, disability: accommodations.

207. See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 217 (2000) (noting “the perceptions and expectations associated with
disability and work help to shape judgments about the capacity of persons with a disability to perform
adequately within specific environments”).
208. NORDEN, supra note 198, at x. From this standpoint, disability is not just a reflection of
social norms; it is a “politically charged commodity” that the media is selling to the public. Id.
209. See supra note 24.
210. Disability has long been a category in the welfare state exempting one from the labor
market. DEBORAH STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 4–10 (1984). See generally Bradley A. Areheart &
Michael Ashley Stein, The Disability–Employability Divide: Bottlenecks to Equal Opportunity, 113
MICH. L. REV. 877 (2015) (book review) (exploring the disability–employability divide).
211. TenBroek & Matson, supra note 23, at 821–22.
212. Areheart & Stein, supra note 210, at 883 (citing STONE, supra note 210, at 29).
213. STONE, supra note 210, at 54–55.
214. See generally Areheart & Stein, supra note 210 (exploring this administrative distinction).
215. See Substantial Gainful Activity, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/
cola/sga.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (“To be eligible for disability benefits, a person must be unable
to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA).”).
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D. Social Meanings of Workplace Accommodations
The understanding of workplace accommodations as a legal right has
only been around for the last few decades.216 Both Title VII (religion) and
the ADA (disability) provide such a right, though the ADA’s provision of
reasonable accommodations is more pronounced both in terms of the
numbers of legal claims made (in the wake of a denial) as well as employer
awareness. While costless accommodations are often prominently featured
in the media, there are many accommodations (such as reassignment or job
restructuring) that greatly impact the employer or co-workers.217 There has
not been much effort to theorize the social meaning of accommodations,
but we can derive such meaning through harmonizing several strands of
social science and legal inquiry.218
A first and salient indication of the social meaning of accommodations
is found in the ADA’s effect on employment for people with disabilities. It
is difficult to disaggregate correlation from causality. At least, we can say
that the employment level of people with disabilities has steadily dipped
since the ADA’s passage.219 At most, we can say that the implementation
of the ADA, and its concomitant requirement of reasonable
accommodations, caused the dip.220 The reasoning would be that the ADA
disincentivizes employers from hiring people with disabilities since the

216. Of course, voluntarily provided accommodations—such as allowing an employee to leave
work early for a personal appointment or the purchase of an ergonomic chair—have been around much
longer.
217. E.g., Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1045, 1056 (2000) (“Of all the accommodations listed in the ADA, the reassignment
accommodation has generated the most litigation and fueled the greatest amount of controversy.”); see
also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS (1992) (discussing how accommodations increase business costs); Alex B. Long, The ADA’s
Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent Third Parties”, 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 869
(2003) (“Over time, it has become clear that the greatest potential source of conflict over reasonable
accommodation involves accommodations . . . that limit the discretion of employers or adversely impact
other employees.”).
218. But see Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1109–15 (2014) (exploring the
“special treatment” stigma that results from the requirement to provide special accommodations in the
workplace).
219. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 31, at 117 (“Indeed, by virtually all reports the employment
rate for Americans with disabilities has declined over the time the statute has been on the books.”).
Bagenstos then argues that factors extrinsic to the statute played a significant role in the employment
decline of people with disabilities, namely, “that the 1990–1991 recession pushed an unusually large
number of people with disabilities out of the workforce and onto the Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) rolls.” Id.
220. E.g., Porter, supra note 218, at 1110 (“Many argue that the reason for [the low employment
level of people with disabilities following implementation of the ADA] is because employers are
resistant to providing accommodations to individuals with disabilities so they simply do not hire
them.”).
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perceived cost of accommodations is repugnant221—whether the cost is
financial, loss of worker morale, or limits on the employer’s autonomy to
structure work as it sees fit. The truth on causation is likely somewhere in
the middle, but these facts suggest that the social meaning of
accommodations is not neutral. The meaning of accommodations has likely
had some causal effect on the employment level of people with disabilities,
which decreased following the ADA’s passage and remains at an historical
low.222
A second signal of what people think about accommodations is found
in employers’ resistance to the ADA. From the start, employers were
antagonistic to being required to change the structure of the workplace
(either physically or by policy) through accommodations. For example, the
National Association of Manufacturers, the American Banking Association,
and the National Federation of Businesses all voiced their opposition to the
ADA’s access and accommodation requirements.223 With the more recent
ADAAA, employers’ resistance to expanding accommodations was
overshadowed by their acceptance of broader antidiscrimination
protections. Of course, the two were directly related. The ADAAA
represented a political compromise in which employers agreed to a nearly
universal scope of antidiscrimination protection in exchange for keeping a
relatively higher threshold for accommodation claims.224 Pure
antidiscrimination protections, where the person is qualified without an
accommodation, generally require only a refrain from discrimination and
not a restructuring of the workplace.225 In contrast, employers viewed any
expansion of accommodations gravely, since more accommodation
requests—even if the accommodations sought were all theoretically
costless—would yield more indirect costs from having to determine
whether and what accommodations are required as well as the real costs
involved in any litigation.226
A social meaning of accommodations can also be deduced from the
narrative concerning a public backlash to the ADA, which has been
consistently advanced by public commentators. There has been book after

221. See, e.g., Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 23 REGULATION, no. 1, at 22–23 (2000) (documenting how the ADA’s accommodation
mandate has increased the cost of employing disabled workers and thus made such workers unattractive
to businesses).
222. See supra note 193.
223. MARTA RUSSELL, BEYOND RAMPS: DISABILITY AT THE END OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 114
(1998).
224. Barry, supra note 48, at 262–64.
225. One possible exception would be if an employer is forced to change a job to reflect its
essential functions. See 42 USC § 12111(8) (2012) (defining “qualified” as able to “perform the
essential functions of” a job).
226. Barry, supra note 48, at 221, 259.
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article after op-ed attempting to explicate this backlash.227 The heart of the
backlash, or controversy, is Title I’s accommodation mandate,228 which
requires employers “to do something that no federal employment rights
statute had ever done before: . . . engage with a disabled employee or
applicant in a good faith interactive process to find ways to accommodate
the employee’s disability and enable him to work.”229 Studies show that
employers resist accommodations by preventing employees from
requesting accommodations or by failing to grant their employees’
requests.230 The most obvious reason for resistance is potential cost, but
part of the pushback is also because the accommodation requirement
dramatically shifted the balance of power between employers and
employees.231 Another reason is that effective accommodations often
require restructuring parts of the workforce or workplace.232
Synthesizing these several strands of analysis, we see employer
opposition to accommodations from the inception of the ADA through its
recent amendment.233 That opposition has infiltrated public views about
accommodation, culminating in something that is consistently labeled a
backlash to the ADA.234 And beyond all of the argumentation about
whether the ADA and its concomitant requirement of workplace
accommodations is a good idea is the unassailable fact that employment
outcomes for people with disabilities have worsened in the twenty-five
years following the ADA’s passage.235 Even though employers make
227. For example, an entire symposium took place under the umbrella of “Backlash Against the
ADA” in 2000. It was held by the Berkeley Journal of Labor and Employment Law and featured
twenty-one distinguished contributors. Symposium, Backlash Against the ADA, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1 (2000); see also, e.g., BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY
RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003); RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST
DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 96–125 (2005); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY,
DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT 48–58
(2005).
228. Richard V. Burkhauser, An Economic Perspective on ADA Backlash: Comments from the
BJELL Symposium on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 367, 367–
68 (2000) (suggesting that ADA backlash is constituted by various constituencies wrestling with the
ADA’s requirement of reasonable accommodation); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and
the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000) (observing the ADA’s
requirement of reasonable accommodations rests on the controversial idea of treating people differently
to achieve equality).
229.
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4
(2000).
230. E.g., Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social Construction of Disability in
Organizations: Why Employers Resist Reasonable Accommodation, 25 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 397
(1998).
231. Krieger, supra note 229, at 4.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 223–226 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 227–232 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 219–222 and accompanying text.
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accommodations for employees all the time,236 there is evidence employers
are less willing to do so once an employee makes a request that could
denote a legal obligation.237 The bottom line is that the social meaning of
accommodations among the constituency that matters most when it comes
to work (employers) is seemingly negative.
The next two sections argue that the reform efforts to secure pregnancy
accommodations discussed above have the potential to revitalize
paternalistic attitudes toward pregnant employees, signal incapacity to
work, and increase sex discrimination. Section E considers the expressive
harms associated with treating pregnancy specially.
E. The Expressive Harms of Special Accommodations for Pregnancy
Each of the proposals for pregnancy accommodations has the potential
to create new social meanings about pregnant identity. Understanding the
expressive meaning of such measures is critical since they stand to impact
all women. The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), for example, is
not a niche law protecting a “discrete and insular minority.”238 About 80%
of women will bear a child at some point in their lifetime.239 And the group
of women who will actually become pregnant, but not bear a child, is
larger. Moreover, while the law only implicates those who become
pregnant, the group who is perceived as able to become pregnant is likely
larger still. The result is that any signals about pregnant workers stand to
impact all women.
All of these proposals are potentially problematic in that they single out
pregnancy as a condition uniquely in need of accommodation.240 The ADA
proposal is doubly problematic, as it equates pregnancy with disability and
yields its own discrete set of expressive harms that are discussed in Section
F. This section focuses on the PWFA and its state analogues. These statutes
and bills treat pregnancy specially and in the most conspicuous way
236. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW 83 (2010) (“Employers accommodate
(nondisabled) employees all the time. A supervisor may, for example, give an employee time off to
attend a child’s little league championship or to play in the finals of a club golf tournament.”). This
goes hand in glove with the observation that the workplace is always already structured to
accommodate some, but not other, potential employees. In particular, workplace environments and
equipment have been historically built or structured with a certain type of employee in mind—namely
able-bodied, heterosexual, Protestant white males with help at home.
237. Porter, supra note 218, at 1109–10.
238. This language was included in the original preamble to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)
(1992), and more famously in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
239. See GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., CHILDLESSNESS UP
AMONG ALL WOMEN; DOWN AMONG WOMEN WITH ADVANCED DEGREES 1 (2010), http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/758-childless.pdf (observing that one in five American women ends
her childbearing years without bearing a child).
240. See supra Part I.A–B.
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possible: by giving pregnant workers a stand-alone law that entitles them to
accommodations. Such laws indicate that women need special treatment in
order to be productive workers.
There are a myriad of expressive signals associated with treating
pregnancy specially. The most obvious signal is a positive one: that
denying accommodations for pregnant workers is wrong. This signal would
likely result in many employers, as a prophylactic matter, providing
accommodations to pregnant workers.241 But such gendered, protective
measures always carry “concealed costs,”242 which are revealed by an
expressive analysis. This section discusses the expressive harm, as
constituted through signals (the statements a law makes) and consequences
(the results of those statements), associated with treating pregnancy
specially.
i.

Signal: Women as More Costly Employees

One signal resulting from special treatment would be that women are
more costly employees. Women of childbearing age must already contend
with potentially being seen as more costly employees.243 These costs are
primarily those associated with leave for childbearing, but also include the
cost of continued benefits during maternity leave.244 An accommodation
right thus compounds these costs. As explained above, accommodations are
not seen as costless. The cost may be financial, a loss of workplace morale,
or a reduction in the employer’s autonomy to structure jobs and the
workplace as it sees fit. There have been many pieces written in a seeming
effort to de-stigmatize accommodations; the primary arguments are that
accommodation is in essence antidiscrimination,245 most accommodations
are costless or inexpensive,246 and accommodations benefit everyone.247
241. This signal would be compelling since the PWFA has the potential to add a transactional
cost, namely lawsuits, that would reduce the utility in exercising a preference to not accommodate and
potentially exclude pregnant workers.
242. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 22, 1986 WL 728369, at *22.
243. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2157 (1994).
244. Id.; see also Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 290–300
(2000) (arguing that the FMLA likely has a negative effect on the wages of female workers because
employers can predict that women are more likely to take FMLA leave).
245. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 643,
645 (2001) (asserting that accommodations resemble and sometimes overlap with antidiscrimination
measures); Michael Ashley Stein, supra note 14, at 583 (arguing that accommodations are
antidiscrimination remedies).
246. See, e.g., Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with
Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 321 (2009)
(“[E]mpirical research has found that the costs of most accommodations are minimal or may even
provide employers net long-term economic gains.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and
“Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 469 (2000) (similar proposition).
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Yet the need for accommodations appears to have retained a stigmatic
value, at least in the eyes of employers. As explicated in Part II, there has
been consistent opposition from employers toward Title I of the ADA and
its principal requirement of reasonable accommodation.248 Consistent with
that, employment levels for people with disabilities have worsened in the
twenty-five years since the ADA’s passage, which is further evidence that
employers view accommodations as costly. Moreover, there is compelling
evidence that co-workers resent accommodations that allow any deviation
from normal workplace rules or provide any other type of special
treatment.249 Such resentment further influences and affirms employers’
natural aversion to legally required accommodations.250
ii. Signal: Women as Less Fit for Work
A second signal from special treatment would be that pregnancy is
incompatible with work. As explained above, laws that have historically
protected women by targeting the challenges of pregnancy and motherhood
have reified stereotypes about women’s limitations as workers, as well as
stereotypes about their most appropriate domain (home).251 This impact is
subtle, but significant; much of the ongoing fight for women’s equality is
constituted in challenging implicit bias.252 And singling out pregnancy for
special treatment may reinforce unconscious biases regarding women’s
innate capabilities and their capacity to maintain productive careers.253 Said
differently, emphasizing biological differences between the sexes has the
very real capacity to logicize the differential treatment of male and female
employees.254
The Supreme Court has written, “Legislative classifications which
distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent
risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their
need for special protection.”255 Laws that provide special benefits for
247. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839 (2008)
(arguing courts and agencies fail to recognize the benefits of ADA accommodations to third parties);
Travis, supra note 246 (same).
248. See supra notes 227–232 and accompanying text.
249. Porter, supra note 218, at 1111–14.
250. Id. at 1113.
251. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 7, 1986 WL 728369, at *7; see supra notes 97–99.
252. See generally Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,
56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999).
253. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 18–19, 1986 WL 728369, at *18–19; GEORGIA WARNKE,
AFTER IDENTITY: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND GENDER 184 (2007) (“By singling certain job holders
out as women and by allowing them to be treated differently than others, the law suggests that women
require special rights and accommodations in order to hold jobs others can hold without them.”).
254. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 20, 1986 WL 728369, at 20.
255. Id. at 21, 1986 WL 728369, at *21 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2534216

5 AREHEART 1125-1177 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/19/2016 1:46 PM

Accommodating Pregnancy

1161

women may also make female employees appear less reliable.256 These
types of measures have a very real tendency to marginalize women’s role
as workers.257
While expanding accommodations is a protective measure intended to
be compatible with work, highlighting pregnancy as in special need of
accommodation emphasizes that the thing about a woman which most view
as essentially different (i.e., the capacity to reproduce) is also the thing that
makes her less capable of doing a job according to how it is structured by
the employer. It is a small leap then to see, either consciously or
unconsciously, women as essentially less capable of doing jobs as
structured—to see women as less constitutionally suited for work.258
iii. Consequence: Increase Discrimination
There are always risks to treatment that is seen as “special,” and
singling out pregnancy as uniquely in need of workplace accommodation is
no exception. While measures that protected pregnancy in the workplace
have historically improved conditions,259 such measures have also typecast
women as physically weaker and connected their worth more with the
home than with work.260 These measures resulted in increased
discrimination.261 During debates surrounding the PDA’s enactment,
reformers argued that the measure should not give special treatment to
pregnancy.262 They warned that if it did, “it could increase other forms of
sex discrimination or harassment.”263 Current efforts to secure pregnancy
accommodation reform similarly have the potential to increase pregnancy
and sex discrimination.264

256. Id. at 7, 1986 WL 728369, at *7.
257. Id. at 9, 1986 WL 728369, at *9.
258. WARNKE, supra note 253, at 184 (arguing that special rights for women, can cause
employers to view women as “constitutionally unsuited to responsible working lives”); Porter, supra
note 218, at 1109 (“Employers often see proposals for special treatment as evidence that those
employees ‘just can’t cut it’ in the workplace.”).
259. See supra notes 96–99, 150–153 and accompanying text.
260. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 17–18, 1986 WL 728369, at *17–18; see supra note 101.
261. Supra notes 102–112 and accompanying text.
262. Widiss, supra note 4, at 969. Senator Brooke thus stated, “[Reformers] have not demanded,
nor asked, for [special] benefits. They have asked only to be treated with fairness, to be accorded the
same employment rights as men.” ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 39–40, 1986 WL 728369, at *39–40.
263. Widiss, supra note 4, at 969.
264. Id. at 976 (acknowledging that mandating employers provide accommodations may increase
discrimination when it comes to hiring and termination decisions); Porter, supra note 218, at 1099
(observing the need for accommodation results in “employers’ reluctance to hire these employees
because of the real or perceived costs of employing such individuals”), id. at 1110–11 (“[A]nything that
arguably increases the costs of employing an individual or makes it more difficult for an employer to
fire an employee might incentivize an employer to not hire the individual in the first place.”).
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While some might perceive a qualitative difference between measures
giving pregnant women the selective right to invoke accommodations and
paternalistic measures that limit the type of work that women can do, both
measures spring from the same implicit principle: that pregnant women, by
their very constitution, are different from men in their capacity to work.
The two signals discussed above may increase discrimination. First,
signaling that pregnant women need special measures to succeed in the
workplace may indicate that they are not generally fit for work. To the
extent this impacts employers’ perceptions regarding pregnant employees,
there is a risk for all women who are seen as likely to become pregnant.265
There may be a variety of subtle or even unconscious responses, such as
giving such employees less responsibility or slotting them into positions
more traditionally assigned to women. Such responses may have serious
long-term consequences—even if they stop short of legally defined
discrimination.
Second, signaling that one needs special measures to succeed in the
workplace might indicate that it is costly to hire employees who are likely
to become pregnant or retain those who already are.266 If so, this might
yield a preference for hiring men. Employers already overestimate the cost
of accommodations for people with disabilities,267 and there is little reason
to suggest this overestimation would not occur in the context of pregnancy.
F. The Expressive Harms of Equating Pregnancy and Disability
This section will now turn to the proposal to treat pregnancy like a
disability. Here, there are numerous potential signals that have the capacity
to alter the social meaning of pregnancy and inflict expressive harms. At
the outset, it is worth noting that pregnancy may be viewed in broad strokes
as a normal developmental state or as an illness.268 In the context of
working, there is a “catch-22” to these alternate characterizations. If
pregnancy is a normal state, then perhaps employers should ignore it
(hence, its current lack of entitlement to accommodations under the
ADA).269 If pregnancy is viewed as a disability requiring workplace
accommodations, however, employers may see pregnant women as
265. See supra Part II.E.
266. Travis, supra note 246, at 321; see supra note 264.
267. This can be deduced from the fact that accommodations are typically costless or
inexpensive, Bagenstos, supra note 246, at 469; Travis, supra note 246, at 321, and yet employers
discriminate to avoid hiring those with an entitlement to accommodation. See supra notes 219–222 and
accompanying text.
268. Sheila Taylor Myers & Harold G. Grasmick, The Social Rights and Responsibilities of
Pregnant Women: An Application of Parsons’s Sick Role Model, 26 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 157, 158
(1990).
269. GROSS & PATTISON, supra note 166, at 60; Widiss, supra note 4, at 976.
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disabled and less fit for work.270 The decision to treat pregnancy as a
normal state or as a disability is thus not without consequence.
It should be noted at the outset that all of the previous critiques in
Section E apply with equal force because treating pregnancy like a
disability is still an approach that privileges pregnancy. Thus the
expressions below are in addition to the potential harms outlined in Section
E.
i.

Signal: Women as Disabled

One potential signal resulting from treating pregnancy as a disability is
that employers see pregnant employees as disabled. That connection is
simple enough, but its expressive dimensions are less so. As I have
endeavored to show, the label “disability” is chock-full of social
meaning—and much of it is lamentably negative.271 People with disabilities
have been seen for centuries as defective, abnormal, and inferior.272 The
media has reflected and furthered such stigma by consistently presenting
disability as deserving of pity or scorn.273 These social views are
straightforwardly stigmatic.
Prescribing the label of disability is a calculated risk, because
expressions of normality are powerful. Consider the vigor with which
homosexual rights advocates fought for exclusion from the ADA and the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the authoritative
manual of the American Psychiatric Association. There was a view in both
instances that pathologizing homosexuality would set back efforts to
achieve social equality.274 Transgender activists have similarly fought
gender identity disorder’s inclusion under the ADA.275 These episodes
reveal how important it is for legal expressions to foster inclusion and
normality, rather than exclusion and pathology. All of this, combined with
pregnancy’s current social status of being seen as healthy, natural, and

270. Widiss, supra note 4, at 961–62; see supra note 269.
271. See supra Part II.C.
272. See supra notes 173–180 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text.
274. See HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A. KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC
BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS 18, 55–99 (1997) (explaining how protests by gay
activists led to the elimination of homosexuality from the DSM-II in 1974); Barry, supra note 181, at 3
n.9 (noting that the lesbian and gay community supported exclusion of homosexuality and bisexuality
from the ADA).
275. Barry, supra note 181, at 41–42 (discussing transgender activists’ opposition to ADA’s
coverage of gender identity disorder on grounds that it implies that transgender people are “not
normal”); Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity Might, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 105 (2006) (discussing some transgender activists’ “aversion to being
included within the stigmatized community of disability”).
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compatible with productive work, should give us significant pause before
we underline the connection between pregnancy and disability.276
One might agree with all of the observations about disability stigma,
but counter that part of how we can normalize disability is through
equating it with something just like pregnancy, which is typically
considered normal and healthy. One might thus argue that treating
pregnancy as a disability has the potential to reform disability stigma.
My response is that the social meaning of disability has been
constructed over centuries, is more deeply entrenched, and is unlikely to be
modified by pregnancy’s mere coverage under the ADA.277 The social
meaning of disability is sticky. In contrast, the social meaning of pregnancy
has proved mutable and more susceptible to expressive swings.278 If the
ADA were amended to protect pregnancy, the more likely result would be
expressive harms to working women—not a meaningful change in the
social meaning of disability.
ii. Signal: Women as Less Fit for Work
A second potential signal from pregnancy’s treatment as a disability is
that pregnancy is incompatible with work. As an initial matter, all of the
observations in Section E about how special treatment for pregnancy
undermines women’s perceived fitness to work apply here. But we must
also consider the expressive impact that labeling pregnancy as a disability
has on perceived work capability.
As explained above, disability status expresses an inability to work.
This signal is reflected in and further constructed by a 20% employment
level for people with disabilities,279 the structure of public disability
benefits that define disability as an inability to work,280 and the very
semantics of the word disability.281 Indeed, some feminists have previously
argued that pregnancy should not be characterized as a disability given the
negative signals that might attach to pregnancy—most notably, a lack of
fitness to work.282 Even if the public does not consciously believe such

276. I write “underlining” since, as noted above, there is already a connection in that pregnancy
sometimes leads to complications that qualify as ADA-sanctioned disabilities. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 210–215 and accompanying text; see also Areheart & Stein, supra note 210
(discussing in depth this binary administrative distinction).
281. See supra notes 24, 209 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating
Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 250 (1998) (noting
that “bringing pregnancy under the ADA would reinvigorate the stereotype of pregnant women as
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stereotypes, there is still an implicit message about relative ability that is
found in the very word.
The complicated association between disability and sickness is another
way in which the linkage to disability might signal pregnant employees are
less fit for work. Of course, disability and sickness are not the same.283 And
people with disabilities have fought the characterization of disability as an
illness.284 There is nevertheless a close association between disability and
illness.285 Moreover, there are many pregnancy symptoms that are only
narrowly removed from being considered sickness. Labeling pregnancy a
disability would only quicken the association. Ultimately, treating
pregnancy as a disability may cause people to see pregnancy more like a
sickness than a normal, healthy state.286
The result of strengthening the association between pregnancy and
sickness is not a good one. Empirical studies demonstrate that the more
closely employers and co-workers associate pregnancy with sickness, the
more they expect or assume inferior performance from pregnant
employees.287 While some association between pregnancy and sickness
may naturally exist,288 explicitly linking pregnancy and sickness vis-à-vis
disabled and not fit for work”); see also Maria O’Brien Hylton, “Parental” Leaves and Poor Women:
Paying the Price for Time Off, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 475, 513–14 (1991) (“[O]ne danger of analogizing
pregnancy to other disabilities is that this has the effect of preserving male characteristics as the
norm.”); Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
94 YALE L.J. 929, 942 (1985) (“[P]regnancy is neither a disability nor a dysfunction, but a normal
moment in the human reproductive process specific to women.”)
283. Except possibly in the technical sense that health is sometimes said to be the absence of
disease and few would say someone disabled is in perfect health. Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap,
and the Environment, J. SOC. PHIL., March 1992, at 105, 106. However, this type of reasoning is
tautological. For example, many people with disabilities have no identifiable illness or sickness.
Moreover, many ill people would not, by any measure, be considered disabled. See generally Susan
Wendell, Unhealthy Disabled: Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES
READER 161 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th ed. 2013).
284. E.g., Amundson, supra note 283, at 106 (arguing disabilities are not per se diseases); see
Wendell, supra note 283, at 161–62 (observing many have fought the problematic association given its
tendency to imply disability is simply a medical problem in need of a medical solution).
285. Entire chapters have been written on this phenomenon. See, e.g., Amundson, supra note
283, at 106; see also AMA STANDARD NOMENCLATURE OF DISEASES AND OPERATIONS (Richard J.
Plunkett and Aladine C. Hayden, eds., 4th ed. 1952) (listing under his definition of disease muscle
paralysis, color blindness, scars, missing limbs, and stab wounds).
286. See also supra notes 269–270 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., GROSS & PATTISON, supra note 166, at 56–58 (summarizing empirical work on
pregnancy stereotyping and noting such studies suggest that one explanation for such “negative
attitudes may stem from the linking of pregnancy with illness”); Helen M. Pattison, Harriet Gross &
Charlotte Cast, Pregnancy and Employment: The Perceptions and Beliefs of Fellow Workers, 15 J.
REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 303, 310 (1997) (finding “a clear gender effect in the nature of people’s
perceptions and beliefs about pregnancy and work”), id. at 312 (“There is some evidence in our results
that negative views of pregnancy and employment may arise from the negative stereotype of pregnant
women as invalids.”).
288. See Myers & Grasmick, supra note 268, at 170 (“An overwhelming majority of the
respondents in our sample held expectations for pregnant women that are analogous to expectations for
sick people.”).
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coverage under the ADA may consolidate any association and, in turn,
cause pregnant women to be seen as less capable workers. The association
of pregnancy with sickness may also affect women’s own views of
themselves as competent workers, which may lead to poorer work
performance.289
iii. Consequence: Increase Discrimination
Equality for pregnant women in the workplace requires employers to
see pregnancy as a normal and manageable condition. Proposals that
highlight pregnancy as a condition analogous to disability will likely cause
employers to see pregnancy as abnormal and difficult to manage. Such
proposals may also accentuate the idea that pregnancy imposes costs on
businesses, thus increasing discrimination against pregnant employees.
Treating pregnancy as a disability may increase discrimination for
reasons that are unique to disability’s social meaning. There is evidence
that employers often choose not to hire or promote workers that they
perceive as disabled.290 Disability has long been stigmatic and,
notwithstanding some progress, the label still engenders a lot of stigma in
2016. If we consider pregnancy a per se disability, it may send the message
that pregnancy is a type of deficiency, and something that makes pregnant
women less fit for work. An employer, moreover, might choose not to hire
a worker it sees as less fit to work, due to the multiple and intersecting
associations with accommodations, disability, sickness, and special
treatment.291 The result is that there are risks to hitching pregnancy to
disability.
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
We must be more attentive to how we frame pregnancy rights, and
more specifically, how best to achieve broader workplace accommodations.
Rights—even those that might confer substantial benefits—are not without
costs. Protected class-based rights do more than simply provide a form of
legal recourse; they convey value judgments and influence social norms
with respect to the underlying identity groups.292
289. GROSS & PATTISON, supra note 166, at 53; see REBECCA KUKLA, MASS HYSTERIA:
MEDICINE, CULTURE, AND MOTHERS’ BODIES 132 (2005) (observing that pregnant women’s selfunderstandings are constituted in part by popular, public narratives).
290. See supra Part I.C.
291. See also James Hanlon, The ‘Sick’ Woman: Pregnancy Discrimination in Employment, 4 J.
GENDER STUD. 315, 322 (1995) (noting that in the UK “[t]he comparison of a pregnant woman with a
sick man has reinforced stereotypes of the position of women in society”), id. at 323 (“equat[ing]
pregnancy with sickness is to debase women’s [working] role in our society”).
292. See supra Part II.A.
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A skeptical reader may protest that while the expressive consequences
outlined above are problematic, it is not worth abandoning the push for
pregnancy accommodations. After all, many of the stories evincing a need
for pregnancy accommodations induce great sympathy. One might further
argue that it is impossible to know exactly what expressive consequences
will result from pregnancy accommodation proposals. However, we do
know that lack of pregnancy accommodations is inhibiting the progress of
women in the workplace.
Expressive theories “are regulative theories that provide principled
constraints on how we go about pursuing various ends.”293 Accordingly, we
ought to consider alternatives to the pregnancy accommodation proposals
outlined above. The strong case for the end of pregnancy accommodations
must not be conflated with the question of whether the ADA—or some
other pregnancy-specific entitlement—is the most appropriate means to
achieve that end.294 The more critical question is not whether—but how—
we achieve pregnancy accommodations.
We might ask whether pregnancy creates needs in the workplace that
are similar to or different from those arising from causes other than
pregnancy.295 The question is not whether pregnancy is unique or different
from other states of being, but whether it is different in ways that require
fundamentally different workplace solutions.296 As several commentators
have observed, the problems and discomforts that pregnant women face are
not inherently unique. They are “the result of poor work practices that
affect the whole workforce and may reflect a poor attitude to work design
and conditions.”297 In this way, pregnancy highlights the structural problem
of unaccommodating workplaces298 as well as “the myth that efficiency and
profit demand one-size-fits-all workplaces and workers.”299 But to try and
achieve pregnancy accommodations only with recourse to sex pays homage
to “the time-honored tendency to use sex-based distinctions in the place of

293. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1512; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
294. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1561.
295. Williams, supra note 57, at 326. This recalls a line from a brief submitted by the American
Civil Liberties Union, the League of Women Voters of the United States, and the National Women’s
Political Caucus years ago: “The task here is to recognize the real needs of pregnant workers without at
the same time destroying their right to equality in the workplace and perpetuating stereotypes which
have, for generations, cast women “into an apologetic place in relation to work.” ACLU Brief, supra
note 96, at 8–9, 1986 WL 728369, at *8–9.
296. Williams, supra note 57, at 357–59.
297. GROSS & PATTISON, supra note 166, at 63.
298. See Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A Disability Paradigm of Sex
Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1297, 1297–98 (2008) (arguing work environments are structured
around the “male ideal worker”).
299. Stein et al., supra note 31, at 693.
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other more functional categories, and the view of pregnancy as a uniquely
incapacitating ‘delicate condition.’”300
Over the last twenty years, there has been a steady stream of esteemed
scholars who have advocated for broader or universal workplace
protections.301 For example, scholars have sought expansion of sexual
harassment jurisprudence to cover nonsexual forms of harassment.302
Scholars have also proposed expanding leave policies to extend beyond
family responsibilities.303 Similarly, Martha Fineman has argued that
vulnerability is a universal part of the human experience and the state
should develop structures to address the disadvantage that accompanies
vulnerability.304 She claims that disadvantage, which includes
discrimination, is best addressed by moving past identity categories.305
This Article’s suggested means of reform fits within this general
turn toward broader protections. The first alternative of universal
accommodations transcends identity categories to generally address
disadvantage. The second alternative broadens the identity categories that
exist to more robustly address vulnerabilities associated with parenting.
A. Universal Accommodations
One alternative would be to accommodate pregnancy through a
universal accommodations scheme. I have previously argued that
300. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 30–31, 1986 WL 728369, at *30–31.
301. See infra notes 302–304. But see Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal
Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1219–20 (2011) (arguing that more universal forms
of workplace protection minimize issues imperiling sexual equality and “dilute feminist workplace
gains”).
302. See, e.g., Brady Coleman, Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the United States
Adopt European “Mobbing” Laws?, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 53 (2006); William R. Corbett, The
Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91 (2003); Rosa Ehrenreich,
Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1999); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2001);
Susan Harthill, The Need for a Revitalized Regulatory Scheme to Address Workplace Bullying in the
United States: Harnessing the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1250
(2010); David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress
Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 (2010).
303. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 31; Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A
Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be
Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001); Chai R. Feldblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities
for Workplace Flexibility: The State of Play, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES 251, 270 (Ann C. Crouter & Alan
Booth eds., 2009); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 835 (2002);
Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
304. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1, 19–22 (2008); see also Ani B. Satz, Disability,
Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513 (2008) (applying
Fineman’s theory to disability).
305. Fineman, supra note 304, at 4, 17.
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reasonable accommodations should be liberally available to all workers
who need them and without reference to one’s identity.306 Decoupling
accommodations from protected classes would have little or no expressive
harms for pregnant workers and would yield economic, hedonic, and
structural benefits.307 My article-length explication of universal
accommodations maps out in detail how such a measure would work.308
A universal right to accommodation would cause employers who value
efficiency to “prophylactically implement changes in policy so as to make
the workplace more accessible for everyone. This could involve employers
publicizing, and implementing standard protocols for, common
accommodations” such as work breaks or modified schedules.309 Such a
policy could ultimately incentivize employers to remake organizational
cultures to accommodate workers more naturally.310 In contrast, treating
pregnancy as a disability or as a status in special need of accommodation
would likely perpetuate the pattern of accommodation claims under the
ADA, in which “individuals advance individual claims and, when
successful, those claims result in employers granting one-time exceptions
to otherwise standard rules and policies.”311
There are also prudential reasons to universalize the right to
accommodations, including that it avoids arbitrary judgments about who is
and who is not worthy of accommodations.312 It also fosters the continued
work of aging employees who might need an accommodation but do not
satisfy the definition of disability.313 Keeping aging employees in the
workforce is critical as the potential insolvency of both Social Security and
Medicare looms ominously.314 An expansion of accommodations would
result in more accommodating environments for all employees, which
would positively impact workplace norms.
Universal accommodations allow us to target the root problem—
workplaces that are structured to exclude non-ideal workers—rather than
just symptoms of the problem (e.g., that an employer does not
306. Stein et al., supra note 31, at 737–44.
307. Id. at 749–55.
308. See id. at 737–44 (arguing for an ADA-type reasonable accommodation mandate to apply to
all work-capable members of the general population for whom accommodation is necessary to enable
their ability to work).
309. Id. at 751.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 752.
312. Id. at 728 (arguing that tying “accommodation to the degree of an individual’s disability
presupposes that the line that marks the necessary level of dysfunction is sufficiently bright to serve as a
sustainable, steady, and objective standard” and that “the extensive history of disability policy suggests
that there is no reliably bright line”).
313. Id. at 704 (arguing one partial solution to rising dependency costs is to incentivize and
support aging workers through the right to accommodation).
314. Id.
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accommodate a pregnant employee’s schedule). In the long run, women
will gain more from strategies that disallow privileging the “ideal worker”
than from those that require preferential treatment or reinforce stereotypes
that may be a detriment to women’s success in the workplace.315
B. Parental Accommodations
A second alternative would be to accommodate pregnancy through a
parental accommodations scheme. Though some have previously argued
for parental accommodations, none have outlined an approach that would
be broad enough to encompass pregnancy. One could in essence, though,
create a hybrid scheme that accommodates both pregnancy and parental
caregiving under the broad umbrella of “parental accommodations.”
Several commentators have claimed that employers should be required
to accommodate the work of parenting.316 Professor Peggie Smith, for
example, argues employers should accommodate routine parental
obligations that conflict with work obligations when employers can achieve
the accommodation without incurring an undue hardship.317 She writes that
in a society that values parental responsibility and lauds children,
employees should be able to meet compelling childcare obligations even
when those obligations clash with workplace norms.318 The cabining
principle would be that the accommodation sought must, as under the
ADA, be “reasonable” and not present the employer with an “undue
hardship.”319 Such a proposal could be expanded to begin with, and
include, pregnancy as the start of parental coverage.
Under a pregnancy-inclusive parental accommodations model, the
employee would need to show that she (1) has a pregnancy need or
compelling parental obligation that conflicts with an employment
requirement; (2) informed the employer about the conflict if possible; and
(3) was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting
employment requirement.320 If the employee stated a prima facie case based
on the above criteria, the employer would then have the burden of
establishing (1) that it made a good faith effort to accommodate the
315. Cf. ACLU Brief, supra note 96, at 35, 1986 WL 728369, at *35 (“In the long run women
will benefit more from laws which prohibit any discrimination on the basis of sex than those which
require preferential treatment and reinforce invidious stereotypes.”).
316. Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 306–09 (2004); Peggie R. Smith,
Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from
Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2001).
317. Smith, supra note 316, at 1446.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1465–66.
320. This is a slight modification of Professor Smith’s criteria. Id. at 1466.
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employee’s parental obligations, or (2) that it was unable to reasonably
accommodate the employee without experiencing an undue hardship.321
A parental accommodations approach would of course protect both
men and women in their roles as parents and should thus aid with the
potential expressive harms outlined above. Yet it is possible that a parental
accommodations law would be seen largely as a law that protects
mothers.322 This especially might be the case if men do not willingly
participate in the accommodations afforded by such a law. Ultimately,
“elimination of the incentive-to-discriminate problem” for this proposal
would require “the degenderization of caregiving.”323 If women both
remain the primary caregivers and primarily partake of parental
accommodations, such a proposal could actually worsen the expressive
consequences by extending the perceived costs of accommodations for as
long as the employee has parental obligations.
C. Addressing Potential Objections
In this section, I address three possible objections. The first objection
attacks the political viability of universal accommodations, while the
second and third objections address my claims about the transfer of
disability-related stereotypes to pregnant employees.
i.

Political Pragmatism

One potential objection is that universal accommodations are not
politically pragmatic.324 Admittedly, this argument carries some force.
Employers resist any circumscription of their autonomy to structure the
workplace and jobs as they see fit. One would reasonably expect strong
opposition to any proposal that gives workers more rights at the expense of
business owners.
Any proposal to improve the workplace must be framed properly to
build political consensus. Any expansion of accommodations involves
various political constituencies and requires attention to the mechanics of
achieving political will.325 Those who are politically liberal have the same
321. Id.
322. See Clarke, supra note 301, at 1273–78 (arguing that universal accommodations would fail
to address the gendered division of labor in which women are expected to provide caretaking and men
are expected to engage in market work).
323. Smith, supra note 316, at 1486.
324. See Clarke, supra note 301, at 1278–79 (arguing a push for universal accommodations is
politically utopian and risks diluting the political will for accommodations for caretaking).
325. Cf. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 603–04 (2008) (exploring the politics of
assembling consensus in the context of antipoverty law).
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reasons to support universal accommodations that they have had for nearly
all civil rights legislation. Accommodations, when administered on the
basis of need, enable all to participate fully in the workforce—where some
would otherwise be excluded entirely.326 Accommodations are about
antisubordination and empowerment for the needy; these are principles that
most liberals ought to support.
Conservatives will be the more important constituency to assuage.
Here, it may make sense to emphasize how universal accommodations
would drive down dependency costs. There is a mounting economic crisis
in the area of public benefits, such as Social Security, Medicare, and
SSDI.327 The costs for these programs are unsustainable.328 Moreover, the
aging and disabled populations are employed at lamentably low rates.329 A
broad accommodations mandate would help individuals experiencing
normal deficits of aging, or people with work-limiting impairments that do
not rise to the level of an ADA-defined “disability,”330 remain work
qualified and productive.331 Keeping aging employees in the workforce is at
least a partial solution to the impending public benefit crisis.332
A related key to capturing the support of economic conservatives is
designing programs that aid the economy but do not distort individual
market-based incentives.333 U.S. public opinion has, largely on this basis,
been hostile to providing cash assistance to low-income people.334
Providing further incentives and support for needy people to work, in lieu
of cash assistance, should thus be the type of proposal that the public as
well as conservatives can get behind.
Moreover, the pursuit of major social change in the marketplace—
whether racial equality or equal pay—is always going to be seen as a less
politically pragmatic approach than other measures that are designed to
achieve less and which protect business interests. The Civil Rights Act of
1964, for example, was not by any measure politically pragmatic. Even if
there are questions surrounding the odds of success, women are better
served to pursue a broader strategy, given the expressive harms outlined in
326. See generally Stein et al., supra note 31.
327. Id. at 753–54.
328. Id. at 704–07.
329. Id. at 707–08.
330. Id. at 713–14 (describing this phenomenon); see also supra note 48 (explaining that the
ADA kept a high bar in place for accommodation claims).
331. Id. at 753–54.
332. For example, empirical data shows that an employee who receives a workplace
accommodation is less likely to apply for SSDI benefits. Richard V. Burkhauser, Lauren H. Nicholas &
Maximilian D. Schmeiser, The Importance of State Anti-Discrimination Laws on Employer
Accommodation and the Movement of Their Employees onto Social Security Disability Insurance
(Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Research Paper No. 2011-251, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961705.
333. Super, supra note 325, at 604, 609.
334. Id. at 607.
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Part II. If universal accommodations are politically unwieldy, some other
gender-symmetrical scheme, such as the parental accommodations model
outlined above, is still preferable and would perhaps present an
intermediate approach.
ii. The ADAAA’s Breadth
Professor Jeannette Cox has argued that the ADA’s inclusion of minor
physical limitations “obviously . . . ameliorates feminist concerns that
characterizing pregnancy as a disability might revive exaggerated
stereotypes about the physical limitations that accompany pregnancy.”335
She later writes that since the ADA now covers arthritis, asthma, and back
pain, “there is considerably less danger that characterizing pregnancy as an
ADA disability will revive assumptions that pregnancy precludes labor
force participation.”336 Instead, pregnancy would be just one additional
physical condition that sometimes necessitates accommodation.337 Cox’s
argument requires three assumptions: (1) the main “expression” associated
with pregnancy’s inclusion under the ADA would be coverage; (2) all
conditions covered under the ADA are comparable for purposes of
stereotyping; and (3) coverage under the ADA is no longer stigmatizing. I
take issue with all three of these assumptions, which I will address in turn.
First, the expression associated with pregnancy’s inclusion would not
simply be coverage. To ensure pregnancy’s coverage under the ADA
would require at least one of two things: another amendment to the ADA,
or a decision by the Supreme Court or several federal courts of appeal. If
any of those occur, the message that pregnancy is now considered a
disability will reverberate around the country as law firms advise their
clients on the far-reaching implications. Pregnancy is more common than
conditions like asthma or arthritis; four-fifths of all women in the U.S. will
become pregnant in their lifetime.338 More importantly, employers are
likely to believe they can tell which employees are capable of becoming
pregnant. It is more difficult to determine who has or will develop, for
example, significant back pain. Accordingly, legislating that pregnancy is a
disability under the ADA would, for the reasons discussed above, have
major expressive implications.339
Second, pregnancy is not comparable to asthma, arthritis, or a bad back
when it comes to the potential for stereotyping. For example, none of these

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Cox, supra note 2, at 451.
Id. at 473–74.
Id. at 474.
LIVINGSTON & COHN, supra note 239, at 1.
See supra Part II.E–F.
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groups have, within recent history, been stereotyped as incapable of work.
Yet pregnancy was widely viewed as incompatible with work just a few
decades ago.340 Even today, pregnancy discrimination persists,341 and not
necessarily because of animus toward pregnancy or women;342 rather some
employers still see inherent tension between pregnancy and work.343
Further, pregnancy is more visible and thus more susceptible to
discrimination than the other conditions Professor Cox lists. In short,
pregnancy’s history of stigma is qualitatively different from many of the
“minor conditions” now covered under the ADA.
Third, there is no evidence that expansion of the ADA’s protected class
has caused a change in people’s normative views about disability or
accommodation. Disability’s social meaning has been relatively static for
centuries344 and is unlikely to change simply due to broader coverage under
the ADA. The stigmatic harms associated with being labeled as disabled
will likely persist. Stigma may indeed be less severe for those with the
minor conditions Professor Cox highlights. However, those conditions are
distinguishable from pregnancy, which has long dealt with stereotypes that
implicate capacity.345 In short, a major and media-amplifying statement that
pregnancy is a disability may stigmatize and reinscribe stereotypes that
have long impacted pregnant workers and women generally.
iii. The Social Model of Disability
Professor Cox makes one other argument that merits response. She
enlists the Social Model of disability, discussed above,346 to argue that
pregnancy’s inclusion within disability accommodations law should not
require characterizing pregnancy as a defect.347 This is due to the way in
which the Social Model reveals that “much of the disadvantage associated
with physiological variation is attributable to contingent social realities
rather than biological defect.”348 She also claims the fact that social realities
may disable a person “undermines the assumption that all physical
conditions that bear a ‘disability’ label are inherently tragic.”349

340. See supra notes 96–99, 150–153 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
342. Jolls, supra note 245, at 686.
343. One reason for this is that employers may see a pregnant applicant or employee as more
costly. Id. Pregnancy discrimination is, in this respect, statistical discrimination. Id.
344. See supra Part II.C.
345. See supra Part II.B.
346. See supra notes 182–186 and accompanying text.
347. Cox, supra note 2, at 450.
348. Id. at 484.
349. Id. at 482.
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My response is threefold. First, and most fundamentally, the force of
this objection lies primarily at the aspirational—and not descriptive—level.
Professor Cox is right about her characterizations of the Social Model and
that equating pregnancy with disability does not require characterizing
pregnancy as a defect. But these statements are aspirational—not
descriptive. Social views on a subject like pregnancy are not a matter of
what is required, but what is perceived. As I argue above, there are good
reasons to be skeptical that the average person now understands disability
as more culturally contingent or as something other than a condition to be
avoided.350 Similarly, even though some sub-groups of people with
disabilities (such as deaf communities) have strenuously claimed they do
not experience their physiological variation as defect or illness, there is not
little evidence these claims have taken root in popular culture, or
transformed the way that the average person or employer thinks about
disability. Disability is not something commonly understood as socially
constructed or existing along a continuum. The social meaning of disability
(especially with a view toward work) is better appreciated through history,
media depictions, and the employment rate of people with disabilities than
through an academic theory hatched by advocates and intended to
reconceptualize the plight and rights of people with disabilities.351
Second, pregnancy is a poor fit within the Social Model. The strongest
fits are conditions that can be seen as mostly or entirely constructed.352 For
example, anorexia nervosa is a condition that has flourished at specific
times and in specific places.353 It may thus be seen as a cultural construct,
no matter the biological mechanisms it provokes.354 Similarly, mental
retardation may be understood as “a historically contingent way of talking
about people who appear to be in need of assistance and who are not very
good at IQ tests.”355 Or consider learning disabilities. The diagnostic label
was invented in 1963 by a psychologist attempting to expand the number of
students who could be diagnosed as “disabled” and thus receive federal
funding.356
350. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
351. See generally Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1251 (2007) (describing how the Social Model was designed by advocates, which explains why
its account of disability causation is so closely associated with progressive policies).
352. See generally Areheart, supra note 172 (arguing that disability is even more socially
constructed than social modelists claim and making the case in part by showing how the very creation
of diagnoses is often spurred along by political, social, and financial incentives).
353. Id. at 368.
354. Joan Jacobs Brumberg, From Psychiatric Syndrome to “Communicable” Disease: The
Case of Anorexia Nervosa, in FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN CULTURAL HISTORY 134 (Charles E.
Rosenberg & Janet Golden eds., 1992).
355. Mark Rapley, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 42 (2004).
356. Craig S. Lerner, “Accommodations” for the Learning Disabled: A Level Playing Field or
Affirmative Action for Elites?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1043, 1058 (2004).
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Pregnancy cannot get the same payoff from the Social Model. In
particular, it is much harder to argue that pregnancy does not entail some
sort of biological essence or that any pregnancy disadvantage is all
constructed. The capacity to reproduce is the thing about women which
most view as essentially different from men.
Third, the claim that disability is not inherently negative (as a
philosophical matter or as a particularized lived experience) does not tell us
how society, in aggregate, perceives its meaning. If others perceive
disability as indicating a lack of ability or deficiency, then ascribing
disability to pregnancy will stigmatize pregnant workers. For example,
some deaf communities resist cochlear implants357 because they do not
perceive that they have a disability—even though the general public does.
Another example is the neurodiversity movement, which argues autism and
bipolar disorder are the result of natural human variation;358 in contrast,
most of the public views autism or bipolar disorder as a defect, or worse,
disease.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that current pregnancy accommodation
proposals, which treat pregnancy as in special need of accommodation or
characterize pregnancy as a disability, are fraught with expressive peril.
The risks of signaling that pregnant women are less capable of productive
work, and regressing from current social norms in which pregnancy is
generally seen as compatible with work, are too great to ignore.359 The best
way to address structural barriers in the workplace and create an egalitarian
society is through a gender-symmetrical approach.360 There are both
gender- and disability-neutral ways to achieve pregnancy accommodations,
and this Article has considered two of them. A universal or parental
accommodations scheme is no panacea, and there are risks with any
approach. Still, this Article has contended such protected class-neutral

357. Cox, supra note 2, at 483–84.
358. See Barry, supra note 203, at 186–88 (discussing neurodiversity movement’s claim “that
autism is not a disorder but a way of being or, more specifically, a ‘different’ way of being, of thinking,
of behaving”); Daniela Caruso, Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal Change, 36 AM. J.L. &
MED. 483, 495 (2010) (discussing the neurodiversity movement).
359. Williams, supra note 57, at 380.
360. Supreme Court litigator on pregnancy issues and, later, Professor Wendy Williams made a
similar argument over thirty years ago:
I continue to believe that the course upon which feminists litigators set out at the beginning
of the 1970’s—the “equal treatment” approach to pregnancy—is the one best able to reduce
structural barriers to full workforce participation of women, produce just results for
individuals, and support a more egalitarian social structure.
Id. at 351–52.
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approaches are better long-term solutions for addressing the structural
workplace norms that act as impediments to gender equality.361

361. Stein et al., supra note 31, at 750–52 (explaining how universal accommodations would
reshape structural norms in the workplace).
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